In the former post we have critically reviewed a book suggesting Kantian account of humans’ obligation to animals. In the following one we critically review an article suggesting that virtue ethics is the right approach to ethical veganism.
In the article called Veganism as a Virtue: How compassion and fairness show us what is virtuous about veganism, Carlo Alvaro, argues that “With millions of animals brought into existence and raised for food every year, their negative impact upon the environment and the staggering growth in the number of chronic diseases caused by meat and dairy diets make a global move toward ethical veganism imperative“, however, billions of animals are still being exploited. And the reason for this he argues “is very complex, but the beginning of an explanation is that the wrong advocates for animals have been leading the discussion“.
Singer, Regan, and like-minded philosophers he argues “have to be given credit for bringing the discussion to light and urging us to question the morality of our relationship with animals. However, their essentialist approach has serious limitations that has caused a delay in acceptance. Their arguments, which rely upon utilitarian calculations of overall preferences (Singer, 1975; Singer, 1980; Singer, 1993), rights (Regan, 2004) and duties (Korsgaard, 2004; Korsgaard, 2009), have been incapable of motivating us to accept the abolition of factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation“.
And later adds that: “The trouble is that, while it is true that animals suffer, this is not, by itself, enough to show that humans and animals are relevantly similar so that human and animal suffering should have equal moral importance“.
First of all, arguments for veganism that focus not only on nonhuman animals suffering but also on the “negative impact upon the environment and the staggering growth in the number of chronic diseases caused by meat and dairy diets” are commonly used for decades now, by many activists, deontologists, utilitarians and whatnot, and billions of animals have kept being exploited. Dozens of researches and hundreds of facts prove how unhealthy, irresponsible and irrational it is. But humans don’t consume animals because it is healthy, environmental, efficient or reasonable, they do it because that’s what they want to. And they don’t stop even when it kills them and their families, and what they refer to as their planet.
Clearly the argument between animal liberationists and non-vegans is radically unbalanced. One side has solid arguments, coherent logic and tens of thousands of conclusive filmed, photographed and written evidences of the billions of victims every single year. While the other side has a desire to keep enjoying the products they like so much and a motivation to maintain its habits no matter how cruel they are. The problem is that no matter how rational and comprehensive an argument is, it loses to motivation.
Even if the animal rights movement gave up on the vision of a non-speciesist world, gave up on the moral debate and focused on the selfish arguments that exclude the animals from the equation, even then it wouldn’t help. Even when activists try to convince others to become vegans for their own benefit – exposing very harsh facts about the health hazards related to animal products consumption, they don’t stop.
To suggest that the blame for the fact that trillions of animals are still being exploited is because supposedly essentialist approaches such as utilitarian calculations of overall preferences, rights, and duties, are leading the discussion; as if virtue ethics is not an essentialist approach in itself, and as if virtue ethics would have achieved a better result; is false and it misses the real problem. The reason these approaches have been incapable of motivating most humans to accept the abolition of factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation, is because most humans have a motivation to keep factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation. Humans are motivated to keep factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation because they benefit from them and they don’t care enough (or at all) about their victims so to liberate them. The problem is not with animal advocates using the wrong arguments but with humans having the wrong motivations.
Even if we ignore the speciesist claim that humans and nonhumans are different in morally relevant ways, and the speciesist claim that “while it is true that animals suffer, this is not, by itself, enough to show that humans and animals are relevantly similar so that human and animal suffering should have equal moral importance“, the fact that nonhuman animals are suffering, all the more so hundreds of billions per year, and from birth to death, is definitely sufficient to constitute a firm, strong, and unequivocal case for veganism. And when a firm, strong, and unequivocal argument doesn’t work the problem is with the addressees.
Problem with Virtue Ethics
Alvaro suggests that we shouldn’t focus on nonhuman animals’ moral status, but rather that “we should begin by morally questioning the attitudes that underlie the use and abuse of non-human animals. When we do so, we often find that we act viciously. Thus, if one is committed to living a virtuous life, he or she will change his or her attitudes toward the use of animals“.
But different humans have different understanding of what living a virtuous life is. What exactly does a virtuous life mean? Different humans also understand ‘acting viciously’ in whole different ways. What exactly does acting viciously mean? Some consider only particular kinds of causing suffering to nonhuman animals as acting viciously, usually when the suffering is done without a benefit to humans – so under this formulation separating a day old calf from his mother is not a vicious act since it is done for a reason?!
And even if there was a general agreement among humans that such an act is vicious, what if humans are not committed to living a virtuous life?
We shouldn’t entrust nonhumans’ fates to humans’ hands even if humans were committed to living a virtuous life, and even if a virtuous life included all causing of all suffering to all animals. But obviously we will never really meet the first criterion, and the second one is not possible even theoretically.
A true virtue, argues Alvaro, strives to produce a good life for others as well. In his words: “A compassionate individual feels sympathy for those who suffer. Sympathy is an important moral feeling because it allows us to respond to something unfortunate or unpleasant happening to others“.
But many humans feel that they are compassionate individuals and that they feel sympathy for those who suffer, and still have massive blind spots regarding the suffering of other ‘others’. This is mostly notable as humans caring about humans similar to them, such as belonging to the same nation, religion, ethnic origin and etc., yet they are absolutely careless about humans who are dissimilar to them in these senses, not to mention how careless they are about nonhumans.
Put it differently, a problem with virtue ethics is that it is based on what is considered as virtue among a particular human society in a particular time, and that criterion is too varied and infirm to seriously suggest basing morality on it.
Another problem in a similar context is that it seems that virtue ethics is some kind of holistic theory that tests if someone is a good person, meaning for someone to be considered a good person that someone needs to have all the moral virtues, however, some humans are morally virtuous in some respects and not at all in others. And this problem relates to the former one, since many people who feel that they are morally virtuous in general, because they supposedly are morally virtuous in some respects, probably feel less obligated to be morally virtuous in other respects. And since humans in general don’t consider nonhumans very highly on their priority list, most humans would most likely not feel the need to be virtuous when it comes to nonhuman animals as they already are morally virtuous in their own eyes. To put it simply, if someone is already labeled as being a good person because in our speciesist world being morally virtuous towards one species is sufficient to be considered a good and moral person, that person is less motivated to be good towards other species.
And more specifically regarding veganism, which Alvaro argues that a true virtue person should be one, we would think that someone who doesn’t consume animal based products, whether as a result of the belief that animals have rights, or whether as a result of the belief that veganism best expresses utilitarian calculations of overall preferences, is a good and compassionate person, because being good and compassionate are anyway the required traits in the first place for humans to bother themselves with respecting the rights or the preferences of nonhuman animals. In other words, a motivation to do good, to act fairly, and to be compassionate are anyway required for someone to morally consider nonhuman animals. The difference is that while rights based ethics and preference utilitarianism are setting criterions and guidelines in a clear and pronounced manner for the compassionate individual, virtue ethics, in this article and in the context of veganism, sets virtues as the important thing and not any criterion or guidelines, but then it practically does set veganism as a criterion and a guideline for being virtuous, so it is unclear how is it not setting a moral rule just as much.
It is as if virtue ethics is merely descriptive. After the motivation to be good is already there, and the guidelines to acting good are already set by other moral theories, then virtue ethics may come and say that the agent is a good person, as evidently s/he acted in a virtuous manner. But virtue ethics doesn’t provide by itself an explanation as to why these actions are virtues. It doesn’t answer the question why virtuous choices and actions are morally good and right. It can’t be that some virtuous choices and actions are morally good and right because these are just what virtuous people do, as that would be begging the question. Therefore there is a need for a theory that defines what is good and what is bad, what is wrong and what is right, independent of moral virtue itself. And this theory may be either a version of utilitarianism, a rights based approach, or some kind of duty approach, but virtue ethics can only be a derivative and secondary moral theory.
Alvaro argues that “The point of virtue ethics is not to draw lines because, as I have explained, virtue ethics is a moral approach that deemphasizes universal rules and consequences and focuses instead on the character of the agent. An agent who has a consistently benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just character will always behave in ways that are benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just. He or she will always act well. Conversely, an agent who is not virtuous will have to rely upon and follow universal rules or prescriptions derived from some utilitarian calculus; but there is no guarantee that the agent will be willing to act according to those rules or that the agent will be satisfied by his required actions“.
Of course there is no guarantee that the agent will be willing to act according to those rules or that the agent will be satisfied by his required actions, but that is even more so the case when all the emphasis is on the character of the agent, who might feel very virtuous, no matter what s/he actually does to others. At least rules aim at being clear and decisive, but practically speaking, what exactly does it mean to be benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just character without having universal rules and consequences? Doesn’t it just leave room for anyone to decide? And if not, who does decide? And according to what criterions? And aren’t such criterions, whatever they may be, a sort of universal rules and consequences?
Alvaro argues that virtue ethics emphasizes the kind of person one is, “There are important factors in morality: whether an intention is right, whether one is following the correct rule, or whether the consequences of action are good. But these factors are not primary. What is primary is whether the individual’s actions are expressions of good character“. And that “According to virtue ethics, the best ways to promote social cooperation and harmony is for people to acquire a good, reliable character. Rules by themselves may give guidelines, but they cannot make people good“.
However, humans, by being given moral guidelines regarding veganism, even if from moral approaches such as utilitarian calculations of overall preferences, rights, and duties, know what would acquire them a good reliable character, they just don’t apply. And by that, prove their bad and unreliable character.
We agree that without humans wanting to do good, good will not be done. But that is so because of humans’ unproportionate power and dominance over every other species. Humans’ power and dominance is so absolute, practically speaking, to the point that morality is very much based on human power and dominance. So this statement indicates how morality is so dependent upon humans’ motivation and willingness to do good, and on how powerless morality is confronting humans’ lack of motivation to do the right thing. To put it plainly, if humans wouldn’t want to do good, things will be bad. And indeed so far along history, things have been terribly bad. And there is no reason to believe that it will change because we will tell humans that veganism is a virtue.
Alvaro raises Cheryl Abbate’s claim that virtue ethics, rather than utilitarianism, duty, or rights, is the appropriate framework for developing an animal liberation ethic because utilitarianism according to her is overly permissive (may permit harming nonhuman animals for trivial reasons as long as interests are maximized), and deontological theory is too restrictive (may prohibit harming nonhuman animals even in cases where it is done to prevent more harm). However, this claim is questionable in itself, and wrong in relation to veganism which is the article’s topic. Utilitarianism is not overly permissive and deontological theory is not too restrictive when it comes to veganism. Veganism is morally required under both approaches and therefore the reason our world is so far from being vegan is not a result of these moral approaches allegedly leading the discussion about veganism. The reason the world is not vegan is because humans don’t want to be vegans.
And if anything, an approach calling humans to become vegans because it is a virtue is the last one to bring about a vegan world, since if humans had a real interest in being virtuous, they would have become vegans despite that supposedly utilitarianism is overly permissive and deontological theory is too restrictive, simply because becoming vegans is a virtue. They don’t, not because the other moral approaches don’t suffice, but exactly since virtue ethics doesn’t suffice, and that’s because humans are not virtuous.
Given that virtue ethics emphasizes the character of the moral agent, if despite that there are so many good reasons to go vegan, still the vast majority of humans are not vegans, what does it say about human character? What does it say about humans’ virtues if they are not willing to do what is so obviously virtuous?
Known Knowns
Alvaro argues that “Unbeknown to many our relationship with animals is cruel and immoral. The reality is that we bring into existence and raise millions of animals in cages, feed them poisons and chemicals, cut them into pieces of various shapes and forms, cook them, and consume their flesh. All this happens before our eyes without our realizing its viciousness. As I will argue, morality is about having a noble character. What we do to animals, anyway we word it or try to justify, is ignoble“.
But this is wrong. Humans do know what’s going on and they do realize the viciousness of their relations with nonhuman animals. Humans don’t have to know every detail about the cruelest exploitation system ever in history, it is enough to generally know that humans are raising billions of animals in cages, feed them poisons and chemicals, cut them into pieces of various shapes and forms, cook them, and consume their flesh, to realize that what humans are doing to animals is ignoble and that anyone who is not vegan is morally accountable.
Humans know that meat is animals’ flesh. Even the least informed humans are at least aware that meat is made of animals who were murdered specifically to make the meat they eat. They are aware of at least that, and still freely choose to participate. They know that animals are born to be killed for their flesh. Meat is never made of animals who died of diseases, accidents, by other nonhuman animals, or of old age, but only of animals that other humans murdered. So humans are not only fully aware of animals being murdered for their meat, murder is an obligatory condition for a corpse to be considered as meat. Humans know meat is murder. Knowing that they participate in hurting nonhumans is sufficient for them to stop. Humans consume animal products because they want to, not because they don’t know any better.
The only thing that at least some humans can honestly say is that they didn’t know the extent of how horrible animals’ lives actually are. But the basic fact that meat is a piece of carcass, should definitely be sufficient to at least ignite basic curiosity and motivation to look for more information, if humans cared. However, humans don’t try to figure out what happens to nonhumans before they become their meat. Extensive information is available for everyone nowadays, and activists are more than willing to explain to everyone what is going on and what they can do about it. So even saying that they didn’t know how horrible animals are treated, is less a case of lack of knowledge, and more a case of lack of motivation.
“Animal Liberation” by Peter Singer was written more than 40 years ago, “Animal Machines” by Ruth Harrison was written more than 50 years ago, and since these two, hundreds more were published, and there are thousands of websites and social media platforms with thousands of videos and tens of thousands of photos documenting animals’ systematic exploitation by humans. Humans have many ways to get the information if they want to, they just don’t.
Humans know meat is a corpse of an animal that was raised and murdered for them. They see animals in all kinds of situations during their lives, in farms when driving out of the city, inside crowded trucks when driving on highways, dead but in a relatively whole and unprocessed state in markets, alive in the case of fish and crustaceans in markets and even restaurants, and of course in the last couple of decades in the movement’s publications, on TV, and online. People know what’s going on. They just don’t care enough to do something about it.
“It seems that virtually all people who care about morality want to be or strive to be fair”, argues Alvaro.
Two questions rise from this claim. One, what counts as fair according to humans? And second, is it fair to entrust the fates of nonhumans to humans’ hands especially considering that most don’t really want to be or strive to be fair?
All in all, virtue ethics relies specifically on humans’ motivation to be good, which makes it particularly anthropocentric and based on human power and dominance. Virtue ethics is actually the most far-reaching moral approach that entrusts nonhuman animals’ fates to humans hands, and that is not only in the simple technical sense that basically it is humans who determine nonhumans’ fates, but in the more fundamental sense of explicitly calling to entrust nonhumans’ fates to the hands of humans hoping they would be interested in being virtuous.
But we shouldn’t entrust the fates nonhumans to humans’ hands hoping they would want to be virtuous. It didn’t work with war, rape, slavery, plunder, murder, various forms of exploitation, various forms of daily violence, and etc., so why would it work in relation to nonhuman animals? Virtue ethics has failed since Aristotle conceived it, so why would it work now?
The fate of trillions of nonhumans shouldn’t be conditioned by the willingness of eight billion humans to be considered good, and in their own eyes.
Having said that, entrusting the fates of trillions of nonhuman animals to the hands of humans is what practically happens in any other moral theory as well. But that is exactly one of the reasons we don’t call activists to keep trying to convince humans to do the right thing, but to do the right thing regardless of other humans.