In the former post we have critically reviewed a book suggesting Kantian account of humans’ obligation to animals. In the following one we critically review an article suggesting that virtue ethics is the right approach to ethical veganism.

In the article called Veganism as a Virtue: How compassion and fairness show us what is virtuous about veganism, Carlo Alvaro, argues that “With millions of animals brought into existence and raised for food every year, their negative impact upon the environment and the staggering growth in the number of chronic diseases caused by meat and dairy diets make a global move toward ethical veganism imperative“, however, billions of animals are still being exploited. And the reason for this he argues “is very complex, but the beginning of an explanation is that the wrong advocates for animals have been leading the discussion“.
Singer, Regan, and like-minded philosophers he argues “have to be given credit for bringing the discussion to light and urging us to question the morality of our relationship with animals. However, their essentialist approach has serious limitations that has caused a delay in acceptance. Their arguments, which rely upon utilitarian calculations of overall preferences (Singer, 1975; Singer, 1980; Singer, 1993), rights (Regan, 2004) and duties (Korsgaard, 2004; Korsgaard, 2009), have been incapable of motivating us to accept the abolition of factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation“.
And later adds that: “The trouble is that, while it is true that animals suffer, this is not, by itself, enough to show that humans and animals are relevantly similar so that human and animal suffering should have equal moral importance“.

First of all, arguments for veganism that focus not only on nonhuman animals suffering but also on the “negative impact upon the environment and the staggering growth in the number of chronic diseases caused by meat and dairy diets” are commonly used for decades now, by many activists, deontologists, utilitarians and whatnot, and billions of animals have kept being exploited. Dozens of researches and hundreds of facts prove how unhealthy, irresponsible and irrational it is. But humans don’t consume animals because it is healthy, environmental, efficient or reasonable, they do it because that’s what they want to. And they don’t stop even when it kills them and their families, and what they refer to as their planet.

Clearly the argument between animal liberationists and non-vegans is radically unbalanced. One side has solid arguments, coherent logic and tens of thousands of conclusive filmed, photographed and written evidences of the billions of victims every single year. While the other side has a desire to keep enjoying the products they like so much and a motivation to maintain its habits no matter how cruel they are. The problem is that no matter how rational and comprehensive an argument is, it loses to motivation.

Even if the animal rights movement gave up on the vision of a non-speciesist world, gave up on the moral debate and focused on the selfish arguments that exclude the animals from the equation, even then it wouldn’t help. Even when activists try to convince others to become vegans for their own benefit – exposing very harsh facts about the health hazards related to animal products consumption, they don’t stop.

To suggest that the blame for the fact that trillions of animals are still being exploited is because supposedly essentialist approaches such as utilitarian calculations of overall preferences, rights, and duties, are leading the discussion; as if virtue ethics is not an essentialist approach in itself, and as if virtue ethics would have achieved a better result; is false and it misses the real problem. The reason these approaches have been incapable of motivating most humans to accept the abolition of factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation, is because most humans have a motivation to keep factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation. Humans are motivated to keep factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation because they benefit from them and they don’t care enough (or at all) about their victims so to liberate them. The problem is not with animal advocates using the wrong arguments but with humans having the wrong motivations.

Even if we ignore the speciesist claim that humans and nonhumans are different in morally relevant ways, and the speciesist claim that “while it is true that animals suffer, this is not, by itself, enough to show that humans and animals are relevantly similar so that human and animal suffering should have equal moral importance“, the fact that nonhuman animals are suffering, all the more so hundreds of billions per year, and from birth to death, is definitely sufficient to constitute a firm, strong, and unequivocal case for veganism. And when a firm, strong, and unequivocal argument doesn’t work the problem is with the addressees.

Problem with Virtue Ethics

Alvaro suggests that we shouldn’t focus on nonhuman animals’ moral status, but rather that “we should begin by morally questioning the attitudes that underlie the use and abuse of non-human animals. When we do so, we often find that we act viciously. Thus, if one is committed to living a virtuous life, he or she will change his or her attitudes toward the use of animals“.
But different humans have different understanding of what living a virtuous life is. What exactly does a virtuous life mean? Different humans also understand ‘acting viciously’ in whole different ways. What exactly does acting viciously mean? Some consider only particular kinds of causing suffering to nonhuman animals as acting viciously, usually when the suffering is done without a benefit to humans – so under this formulation separating a day old calf from his mother is not a vicious act since it is done for a reason?!
And even if there was a general agreement among humans that such an act is vicious, what if humans are not committed to living a virtuous life?
We shouldn’t entrust nonhumans’ fates to humans’ hands even if humans were committed to living a virtuous life, and even if a virtuous life included all causing of all suffering to all animals. But obviously we will never really meet the first criterion, and the second one is not possible even theoretically.

A true virtue, argues Alvaro, strives to produce a good life for others as well. In his words: “A compassionate individual feels sympathy for those who suffer. Sympathy is an important moral feeling because it allows us to respond to something unfortunate or unpleasant happening to others“.
But many humans feel that they are compassionate individuals and that they feel sympathy for those who suffer, and still have massive blind spots regarding the suffering of other ‘others’. This is mostly notable as humans caring about humans similar to them, such as belonging to the same nation, religion, ethnic origin and etc., yet they are absolutely careless about humans who are dissimilar to them in these senses, not to mention how careless they are about nonhumans.
Put it differently, a problem with virtue ethics is that it is based on what is considered as virtue among a particular human society in a particular time, and that criterion is too varied and infirm to seriously suggest basing morality on it.

Another problem in a similar context is that it seems that virtue ethics is some kind of holistic theory that tests if someone is a good person, meaning for someone to be considered a good person that someone needs to have all the moral virtues, however, some humans are morally virtuous in some respects and not at all in others. And this problem relates to the former one, since many people who feel that they are morally virtuous in general, because they supposedly are morally virtuous in some respects, probably feel less obligated to be morally virtuous in other respects. And since humans in general don’t consider nonhumans very highly on their priority list, most humans would most likely not feel the need to be virtuous when it comes to nonhuman animals as they already are morally virtuous in their own eyes. To put it simply, if someone is already labeled as being a good person because in our speciesist world being morally virtuous towards one species is sufficient to be considered a good and moral person, that person is less motivated to be good towards other species.

And more specifically regarding veganism, which Alvaro argues that a true virtue person should be one, we would think that someone who doesn’t consume animal based products, whether as a result of the belief that animals have rights, or whether as a result of the belief that veganism best expresses utilitarian calculations of overall preferences, is a good and compassionate person, because being good and compassionate are anyway the required traits in the first place for humans to bother themselves with respecting the rights or the preferences of nonhuman animals. In other words, a motivation to do good, to act fairly, and to be compassionate are anyway required for someone to morally consider nonhuman animals. The difference is that while rights based ethics and preference utilitarianism are setting criterions and guidelines in a clear and pronounced manner for the compassionate individual, virtue ethics, in this article and in the context of veganism, sets virtues as the important thing and not any criterion or guidelines, but then it practically does set veganism as a criterion and a guideline for being virtuous, so it is unclear how is it not setting a moral rule just as much.

It is as if virtue ethics is merely descriptive. After the motivation to be good is already there, and the guidelines to acting good are already set by other moral theories, then virtue ethics may come and say that the agent is a good person, as evidently s/he acted in a virtuous manner. But virtue ethics doesn’t provide by itself an explanation as to why these actions are virtues. It doesn’t answer the question why virtuous choices and actions are morally good and right. It can’t be that some virtuous choices and actions are morally good and right because these are just what virtuous people do, as that would be begging the question. Therefore there is a need for a theory that defines what is good and what is bad, what is wrong and what is right, independent of moral virtue itself. And this theory may be either a version of utilitarianism, a rights based approach, or some kind of duty approach, but virtue ethics can only be a derivative and secondary moral theory.

Alvaro argues that “The point of virtue ethics is not to draw lines because, as I have explained, virtue ethics is a moral approach that deemphasizes universal rules and consequences and focuses instead on the character of the agent. An agent who has a consistently benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just character will always behave in ways that are benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just. He or she will always act well. Conversely, an agent who is not virtuous will have to rely upon and follow universal rules or prescriptions derived from some utilitarian calculus; but there is no guarantee that the agent will be willing to act according to those rules or that the agent will be satisfied by his required actions“.
Of course there is no guarantee that the agent will be willing to act according to those rules or that the agent will be satisfied by his required actions, but that is even more so the case when all the emphasis is on the character of the agent, who might feel very virtuous, no matter what s/he actually does to others. At least rules aim at being clear and decisive, but practically speaking, what exactly does it mean to be benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just character without having universal rules and consequences? Doesn’t it just leave room for anyone to decide? And if not, who does decide? And according to what criterions? And aren’t such criterions, whatever they may be, a sort of universal rules and consequences?

Alvaro argues that virtue ethics emphasizes the kind of person one is, “There are important factors in morality: whether an intention is right, whether one is following the correct rule, or whether the consequences of action are good. But these factors are not primary. What is primary is whether the individual’s actions are expressions of good character“. And that “According to virtue ethics, the best ways to promote social cooperation and harmony is for people to acquire a good, reliable character. Rules by themselves may give guidelines, but they cannot make people good“.

However, humans, by being given moral guidelines regarding veganism, even if from moral approaches such as utilitarian calculations of overall preferences, rights, and duties, know what would acquire them a good reliable character, they just don’t apply. And by that, prove their bad and unreliable character.

We agree that without humans wanting to do good, good will not be done. But that is so because of humans’ unproportionate power and dominance over every other species. Humans’ power and dominance is so absolute, practically speaking, to the point that morality is very much based on human power and dominance. So this statement indicates how morality is so dependent upon humans’ motivation and willingness to do good, and on how powerless morality is confronting humans’ lack of motivation to do the right thing. To put it plainly, if humans wouldn’t want to do good, things will be bad. And indeed so far along history, things have been terribly bad. And there is no reason to believe that it will change because we will tell humans that veganism is a virtue.

Alvaro raises Cheryl Abbate’s claim that virtue ethics, rather than utilitarianism, duty, or rights, is the appropriate framework for developing an animal liberation ethic because utilitarianism according to her is overly permissive (may permit harming nonhuman animals for trivial reasons as long as interests are maximized), and deontological theory is too restrictive (may prohibit harming nonhuman animals even in cases where it is done to prevent more harm). However, this claim is questionable in itself, and wrong in relation to veganism which is the article’s topic. Utilitarianism is not overly permissive and deontological theory is not too restrictive when it comes to veganism. Veganism is morally required under both approaches and therefore the reason our world is so far from being vegan is not a result of these moral approaches allegedly leading the discussion about veganism. The reason the world is not vegan is because humans don’t want to be vegans.
And if anything, an approach calling humans to become vegans because it is a virtue is the last one to bring about a vegan world, since if humans had a real interest in being virtuous, they would have become vegans despite that supposedly utilitarianism is overly permissive and deontological theory is too restrictive, simply because becoming vegans is a virtue. They don’t, not because the other moral approaches don’t suffice, but exactly since virtue ethics doesn’t suffice, and that’s because humans are not virtuous.
Given that virtue ethics emphasizes the character of the moral agent, if despite that there are so many good reasons to go vegan, still the vast majority of humans are not vegans, what does it say about human character? What does it say about humans’ virtues if they are not willing to do what is so obviously virtuous?

Known Knowns

Alvaro argues that “Unbeknown to many our relationship with animals is cruel and immoral. The reality is that we bring into existence and raise millions of animals in cages, feed them poisons and chemicals, cut them into pieces of various shapes and forms, cook them, and consume their flesh. All this happens before our eyes without our realizing its viciousness. As I will argue, morality is about having a noble character. What we do to animals, anyway we word it or try to justify, is ignoble“.
But this is wrong. Humans do know what’s going on and they do realize the viciousness of their relations with nonhuman animals. Humans don’t have to know every detail about the cruelest exploitation system ever in history, it is enough to generally know that humans are raising billions of animals in cages, feed them poisons and chemicals, cut them into pieces of various shapes and forms, cook them, and consume their flesh, to realize that what humans are doing to animals is ignoble and that anyone who is not vegan is morally accountable.
Humans know that meat is animals’ flesh. Even the least informed humans are at least aware that meat is made of animals who were murdered specifically to make the meat they eat. They are aware of at least that, and still freely choose to participate. They know that animals are born to be killed for their flesh. Meat is never made of animals who died of diseases, accidents, by other nonhuman animals, or of old age, but only of animals that other humans murdered. So humans are not only fully aware of animals being murdered for their meat, murder is an obligatory condition for a corpse to be considered as meat. Humans know meat is murder. Knowing that they participate in hurting nonhumans is sufficient for them to stop. Humans consume animal products because they want to, not because they don’t know any better.

The only thing that at least some humans can honestly say is that they didn’t know the extent of how horrible animals’ lives actually are. But the basic fact that meat is a piece of carcass, should definitely be sufficient to at least ignite basic curiosity and motivation to look for more information, if humans cared. However, humans don’t try to figure out what happens to nonhumans before they become their meat. Extensive information is available for everyone nowadays, and activists are more than willing to explain to everyone what is going on and what they can do about it. So even saying that they didn’t know how horrible animals are treated, is less a case of lack of knowledge, and more a case of lack of motivation.

“Animal Liberation” by Peter Singer was written more than 40 years ago, “Animal Machines” by Ruth Harrison was written more than 50 years ago, and since these two, hundreds more were published, and there are thousands of websites and social media platforms with thousands of videos and tens of thousands of photos documenting animals’ systematic exploitation by humans. Humans have many ways to get the information if they want to, they just don’t.

Humans know meat is a corpse of an animal that was raised and murdered for them. They see animals in all kinds of situations during their lives, in farms when driving out of the city, inside crowded trucks when driving on highways, dead but in a relatively whole and unprocessed state in markets, alive in the case of fish and crustaceans in markets and even restaurants, and of course in the last couple of decades in the movement’s publications, on TV, and online. People know what’s going on. They just don’t care enough to do something about it.

“It seems that virtually all people who care about morality want to be or strive to be fair”, argues Alvaro.
Two questions rise from this claim. One, what counts as fair according to humans? And second, is it fair to entrust the fates of nonhumans to humans’ hands especially considering that most don’t really want to be or strive to be fair?

All in all, virtue ethics relies specifically on humans’ motivation to be good, which makes it particularly anthropocentric and based on human power and dominance. Virtue ethics is actually the most far-reaching moral approach that entrusts nonhuman animals’ fates to humans hands, and that is not only in the simple technical sense that basically it is humans who determine nonhumans’ fates, but in the more fundamental sense of explicitly calling to entrust nonhumans’ fates to the hands of humans hoping they would be interested in being virtuous.
But we shouldn’t entrust the fates nonhumans to humans’ hands hoping they would want to be virtuous. It didn’t work with war, rape, slavery, plunder, murder, various forms of exploitation, various forms of daily violence, and etc., so why would it work in relation to nonhuman animals? Virtue ethics has failed since Aristotle conceived it, so why would it work now?

The fate of trillions of nonhumans shouldn’t be conditioned by the willingness of eight billion humans to be considered good, and in their own eyes.
Having said that, entrusting the fates of trillions of nonhuman animals to the hands of humans is what practically happens in any other moral theory as well. But that is exactly one of the reasons we don’t call activists to keep trying to convince humans to do the right thing, but to do the right thing regardless of other humans.

Considering that Kant is famous for arguing that humans are obligated to treat every human as an end in itself but towards nonhuman beings humans only have indirect duties, constituting a position that defends nonhuman animals’ moral status based on Kant is rather counterintuitive. However, in her book Fellow Creatures – our obligations to the other animals, philosopher Christine Korsgaard argues for a Kantian account of humans’ obligation to animals.

Korsgaard argues that when Kant claims that humans must value every human being as what he called ‘an end in itself’, he meant that humans should treat the choices, ends, suffering and happiness of each human as having an end in itself because they matter to someone. In other words, humans’ ends matter, because they matter to humans and they are valuable because humans value them. Since, as Korsgaard emphasizes, to say that something is good absolutely, doesn’t mean it has a free-floating goodness, but that it is good-for everyone for whom things can be good, in the final sense of good, or good from everyone’s point of view, that means that every human being has a certain kind of inherent value, and that’s why the ends, choices, suffering and happiness of each human should be considered valuable and be respected and even promoted by the community.
As opposed to treating someone as an end in itself, Kant argues that treating someone as a mere means is using someone for someone else’s purposes in a way that is contrary to that someone’s own good and to which that someone could not possibly consent.

Considering that many nonhuman animals are sentient beings capable of suffering, having interests of their own, and that things can be good or bad for them just as they can be good or bad for humans, Korsgaard asks what can possibly justify such an extreme difference between the way humans treat other human beings, or at least the way humans state that they should treat other humans, and the way humans treat nonhuman animals? Why when it comes to humans we must treat each of them as an end in itself, and when it comes to nonhumans we are allowed to treat all of them as a mere means to someone else’s ends in a way that is contrary to their own good and to which they could not possibly consent?

Korsgaard rejects Kant’s answer to the question derived from his own claims which is that only rational beings are ends in themselves and that humans therefore are free to use the other animals as means to their ends, and that nonhumans are not objects of direct moral consideration at all. And she rejects it for the simple reason that sentient nonhuman animals are ends in themselves in the sense that they are creatures for whom things can be good or bad. There is no reason that what is good for rational beings should be treated as good absolutely while what is good for the other animals can be ignored or discounted. Simply because nonhuman animals are creatures for whom things can be good or bad, what is good for them should be treated as good absolutely, as something that everyone must respect and pursue.

Korsgaard also rejects the softer and much more common claim which is that humans are more important than nonhumans. That is not because she thinks other animals are just as important as humans are, but rather because of her perception regarding importance and good, which is that things are important, only when they’re important to someone, and things are good or bad only when they’re good or bad for someone. She argues that there is such a thing as good and bad only because there are creatures in this world for whom things can be good or bad. Therefore, claims about the relative importance of different kinds of creatures do not make any sense to her.

So she doesn’t think that humans are more important than nonhuman. However she does think that humans are rational and moral creatures and nonhumans are not. When she argues that humans are rational she doesn’t mean they are intelligent but that they are asking themselves whether the reasons for which they believe and do things are good reasons or not. She believes that humans are aware of the grounds of their beliefs and actions, saying to themselves – ‘is that a good reason for believing or doing such and such?’, and nonhumans are not. And when she argues that humans are moral beings she doesn’t mean that they are morally good, but that humans’ actions are subject to moral standards, meaning they can be either morally good or bad, while the actions of the other animals are not subject to moral standards and cannot be either morally good or bad.

However, these differences she claims for are irrelevant, according to her, to the question of moral treatment, because of her stance on importance and good. In her own words: “It doesn’t follow from these differences that human beings are better than the other animals because you can only judge one creature to be better than another when they’re subject to a common evaluative standard and one of them meets it to a higher degree than the other one does. When they’re not subject to a common evaluative standard, you can’t rate them against each other. What follows from the fact that we’re rational and moral and the other animals are not is not then that we’re superior to the other animals, but rather that we can have duties to the other animals even though they can have no duties to us.”

That last sentence of this quote is part of the reason she thinks, as opposed to Kant, that nonhumans should be part of Kant’s famous ‘Kingdom of Ends’ – a spiritual or notional community, constituted by the relations among human beings who share a commitment to a conception of themselves and each other as ends in themselves.
Kant argues that the capacity to recognize and respond to reasons, including each other’s reasons, places rational beings in relations of reciprocity which enables them to make certain claims on each other. When rational beings judge that something is good for them, they treat it as something that’s good absolutely, and that they have a good reason to pursue it as long as they are neither harming nor wronging anyone else in doing so. Furthermore, making such judgment is also making a demand that others would respect the pursuit of it by not interfering and possibly even by helping to achieve this end. That is the meaning of treating the things that someone supposes are good as good absolutely. Everyone should treat these ends as things that are worthy of being pursued or realized in anyone’s eyes. In this way, when we choose to pursue our ends, we make a set of demands on ourselves and on others, a set of laws by which we mutually obligate one another to respect and assistance. The reciprocal demands that rational beings make on each other constitute us as a moral community pursuing common ends under common moral laws. This is basically Kant’s famous idea of the Kingdom of Ends.

Kant argued that since nonhuman animals are not rational beings and therefore cannot make and respond to moral laws, they’re not ends in themselves and cannot be part of this community. Korsgaard disagrees claiming that although indeed nonhuman animals cannot join humans in making laws for one another in the Kingdom of Ends, prior to that is the view that something should be treated as good absolutely simply because it’s good for someone, and since nonhuman animals share with humans the capacity for something to be good or bad for them, nonhuman animals are ends in themselves just as much. Animals are ends in themselves in the sense that what is good for them is good absolutely, even if they are not capable of joining with us in reciprocal legislation. Therefore, Korsgaard argues that humans, being rational beings, are members of the moral community in the active sense, and nonhuman animals are members of the moral community in a passive sense. Meaning, unlike humans, they may not be able to make the laws for themselves and each other, but they sure fall under the protection of the laws.

Although we highly disagree with the claims about rationality and morality, certainly with suggesting that all humans are categorically rational and moral and all the rest of the animals are not, given that this perception of her is not practically significant in her Kantian account of humans’ obligation to animals, we wish not to focus on that but rather on an idea, that is not only significant, but is practically the essence of the whole book. The basic idea behind Korsgaard’s Kantian account of humans’ obligation to animals is that each sentient nonhuman animal should be treated as an end in herself/himself, an idea we certainly don’t disagree with its ethical validity but with its possibility.

Human Impossibility

Korsgaard argues that since factory farming (including the so called humane farming), the use of animals in scientific experiments, in circuses, in zoos, and perhaps also in the police and the military, aren’t compatible with treating nonhuman animals as ends in themselves, they are morally wrong.

However, treating animals not as ends in themselves is realized in almost everything humans do, it is everywhere and in everything. The systematical, industrial exploitation of animals in the form of factory farms is by far the worst embodiment of treating animals not as ends in themselves, however it is far from being the only one. Not just factory farming but any type of farming is treating animals not as ends in themselves. The type and level of discrimination obviously largely differ, but excluding nonhumans from a particular area, the removal of native vegetation and planting vegetation that suit humans’ desires and not necessarily the needs of the native residents of the region, fencing the area, constantly poisoning nonhumans in it, changing the composition of the soil, dividing the nearby lands with roads to the farms, plundering water from other habitats, making noise with heavy machinery, crushing nonhumans with heavy machinery, polluting the area with humans’ waste of many kinds and etc. are all unquestionably forms of treating animals not as ends in themselves.

The impossibility of treating others as ends in themselves is derived from life most basic element – consuming energy. It is impossible for any being to live on this planet while treating others as ends in themselves and this ambition is particularly absurd when it comes to humans whose massive and violent footprint is with no comparison to any other creature, even in the case of vegans with a very high environmental awareness.

Some violent practices involved in some plant-based products are known to some activists and vegans, with some even stretching their personal definition of veganism to include for example palm oil, coconut, sugar, coffee, chocolate and etc. But that is because of the specific ways in which some specific products are currently being manufactured, where the violence involved in their production is relatively easy to spot while the whole mechanism is disregarded. The impossibility of treating others as ends in themselves is not in the specific production details, but in each of the ways each of the products is manufactured, transported, consumed and disposed of.

The manufacture of some vegan products that are considered basic such as soy milk, sugar, tofu, bread, oil, tea and etc., can include dozens of sub-processes like: cleaning and removing unwanted parts such as the outer layers, separating the beans from the pod, extracting the interior which is common with seeds, mixing and macerating as in preserved fruits and vegetables, liquefaction and pressing as in fruit juices and soy milk production, fermentation like in soy sauces and tempeh, baking, boiling, broiling, frying , steaming, shipping of a number of ingredients from different distances, wrapping, labeling, transportation of waste and of course transportation to the stores. All are inevitable. All are comfortably invisible as the finished product lies on the shelf.

It is hard to have in mind deforestation and land degradation when buying tofu.
It is hard to consider the amount of energy spent on the label of a can of beans.
It is hard to see all the sub production processes’ harms on a loaf of bread.
It is hard to acknowledge all the methane emissions of a rice milk carton.
It is hard to behold the 4,000 liters of water that were used to produce a cotton shirt.
It is hard to smell the burning wood when sniffing a bar of soap.
It is hard to think of the traps set on the tip of dens when buying cereals.

Despite that they wholeheartedly believe they should treat other animals as ends in themselves, even vegans with a very high environmental awareness are bound to personally, necessarily and inevitably participate in a systematical discrimination against beings from other species.

And it goes way beyond food, any food. Every aspect of humans’ lives is bound with treating animals not as ends in themselves. Every house, every car, every fueling of every car, every road, every ride on every road, every airplane, every flight in an airplane, every boat, every sail in a boat, every production of an electrical device, every use of an electrical device, or of electricity in general, every fence, every waste, and considering the massive harm involved in all stages of production and in routine washing of clothes, not only leather, fur, wool, silk and down, but in fact all clothes are forms of treating animals not as ends in themselves. And this is really just a partial list.

Even in the extremely far-fetched and delusionary optimistic scenario of a revolution in the way humans view nonhumans, it would still be the case that the whole human civilization and everything about the way humans live is built upon a massive global occupation at the expense of all the other sentient beings on this planet who are treated as anything but ends in themselves.
How can an extremely industrial and technological civilization of more than 8 billion humans, that dominates and impacts practically every inch on earth, ever treat all nonhuman being as ends in themselves?

Truly believing that “in suffering we are all equal”, and that “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”, and that truly the suffering of no one is of less importance than the suffering of another, any other, is simply beyond human possibility even theoretically, not to mention practically. Practically, we are still extremely far even from a vegetarian world, not to mention a vegan one.

Nonhuman Impossibility

Animal rights activists obviously acknowledge that nonhuman animals are not treated as ends in themselves in human civilization, however many of them don’t acknowledge that animals in nature are also never treated as ends in themselves.
In fact for many animal rights activists nature represents perfection, a romantic and virtuous ideal we should aspire to. But the truth is that nature is where trillions of sentient beings suffer from hunger, thirst, diseases, parasites, injuries, extreme weathers, rape, infanticide, violent dominancy fights, the constant fear of being attacked, actually being attacked, and only rarely die from caducity.

In many activists’ minds humans are the only problem in this world which without them would be perfect. But…
In a humanless world, hyena cubs would still viciously fight each other, tearing off slices of other cubs’ faces including ears and lips, to get more food.
In a humanless world, crabs would still be pulled apart limb by limb by otters.
In a humanless world, fishes would still be digested alive by the stomach acids of a pelicans who gulped them whole.
In a humanless world, wasps would still inject their eggs into a live caterpillar’s body to ensure that when their descendants hatch they will have easy access to food as the larvae eat the caterpillar from the inside out.
A humanless world is definitely not a masculinity-free world. Brutal fights for territory and for the “right” to mate would still occur in immense numbers. Walrus would still fight each other over territory with giant teeth that can reach up to one meter long and more than 5kg weight. And the biggest males with the biggest tusks would still push their way to the center of the iceberg pushing the females and pups to the edges where they are more likely to be attacked by an orca.
In a humanless world, billions of insects would still get chemically liquefied before they are eaten by spiders. And snakes would still swallow whole animals and slowly digest them until hawks hunt them, digging in with their talons into the snakes’ body until they give up fighting back, and then start to cut off pieces of their body and eat them.
Eels would still electrify other fishes to hunt them using up to 600V in a single discharge – this is 5 times the shock one would get from sticking a finger into an electrical socket.
Young offspring would still be murdered by opportunist males who want their own genes to be spread.
And in a humanless world, duck, dolphin, seal and sea lion females would still be gang raped routinely as a way of mating.

Unfortunately these examples are only a tiny glimpse of the horrors happening every single moment in nature. Every single second somewhere in the world, defenseless and frightened babies are left alone because their mother has to search for food, a turtle is burned alive as she can’t out run the flames of a fire, a bird’s feet are frozen to a branch since he couldn’t find shelter from the harsh weather, a baboon monkey is in ongoing stress as an higher ranking female takes food out of her mouth and eats it herself, a nestling is thrown off the nest by the other siblings so they can get more food, a coyote is experiencing severe hunger as the rabbit he chased managed to escape instead of being torn apart, a female dolphin is being raped after she couldn’t outswim a male or even a few of them who gang rape her, a badger drags his rotten legs with infectious wounds resulting from constant fights, a zebra is dehydrated but can’t approach the ponds as the lionesses might be on the prowl, a lizard is being slowly devoured by a fungus that spread through the organs, a weak robin chick starves to death because his parents don’t feed him as it makes more sense energetically to invest in his stronger siblings.

When it comes to animals living in nature, Korsgaard is aware of the impossibility of treating nonhuman animals as ends in themselves:
“once we invite the animals in to the Kingdom of Ends, that hope of making the world good for everyone is gone. The interests of animals, including now ourselves as animals, are irreparably contrary. Animals eat each other. They necessarily compete for habitat. They necessarily compete for the world’s resources. These conflicts are not avoidable or occasional misfortunes, many of which could be eliminated by just institutions, but built deeply into the system of nature. Far, far more animals are born than the planet can sustain. Most of the sentient beings who are born on this planet are doomed to be eaten, or to starve, or both.” (154)

For every being to be treated as an end in itself is basically oxymoronic. It can’t exist in a world where beings constantly compete with each other over resources, not to mention that for many, other beings are the resources.

Therefore, Korsgaard, who argues that “every sentient animal is a real individual with a center of subjectivity of her own, with experiences that matter to her”, and that “Every sentient animal’s life—his or her individual life—is valuable, at least to the extent that it is valuable to the animal herself” (204), realizes that although nonhuman animals being treated as ends in themselves is a moral obligation derived by their very nature, this can’t be realized in nature. She realizes the hard clash between what should absolutely be and what can absolutely never be.
In her words: “I suggested that work on animal ethics has produced a kind of Kantian antinomy, a case where the same premise appears to yield opposite conclusions. Supposing that we have a duty not to harm animals, and to protect them from harm if we can, those who advocate what I have called “creation ethics” argue that in order to protect animals from natural evils we must make them all domestic, while abolitionists argue that in order to protect animals from our own abuses we must make them all wild. Antinomies reflect deep disturbances in our thought. The disturbance in this case comes from a conflict between our moral standards and the way that nature works. The natural world staunchly resists moral reorganization. As a result, we are unable to treat all animals in the way that morality demands, that is, as ends in themselves who have a claim to be treated in a way that is consistent with their good.” (154)

Some animal activists are not particularly bothered by that, claiming that they are anyway only morally obligated to address the suffering caused to animals by humans. However, exactly because every sentient animal is a real individual with a center of subjectivity of her own, with experiences that matter to her, or in other words, exactly because what makes animals worthy of moral consideration is their subjective ability to experience, not the objective conditions of their lives (such as what species they belong to, where they live, and their relations with other species) or their relations with humans, activists should be obligated to prevent suffering no matter to whom, by whom and where it happens.
Moral status is non-dependent. Sentient beings don’t lose their moral status when their suffering happens in nature.

We mustn’t accept suffering just because it happens in what we refer to as nature, and to nonhuman animals by other nonhuman animals. To the sufferers, suffering is bad when it is considered natural just as much as when it is considered unnatural. And the victims are not consoled by the fact that it is nonhumans that hurt them and not humans. If labeling a violent scene as ’natural’ doesn’t affect the suffering of the victims, then it doesn’t have a moral effect.

Moral treatment mustn’t be based on the relations of animals from specific species with humans, but focus on the morally relevant capacities of the animals. We are morally obligated to help sentient beings in need because of their inherent ability to suffer, not our contingent involvement.
Moral consideration is supposed to be a product of internal abilities, not external relations.

Our goal is to end suffering no matter where it happens or who is causing it. Suffering is intrinsically bad for the sufferer no matter who causes it. So the suffering caused by humans is not more important to prevent than suffering caused by nonhumans.

Activists are morally obligated to end the suffering of nonhuman animals in nature, not because they are the ones who put them in these situations, but because they are the only ones who care enough to put them out.
Activists’ moral aspiration shouldn’t be to solely end the suffering they are responsible for, either individually or collectively as a species, but to strive for the end of suffering in general.

Kant’s highest moral aspiration is ‘Perpetual Peace’ accomplished by actuating the Kingdom of Ends. But nature is inherently so extremely violent, and humanity is even more extremely violent, that this aspiration is practically and theoretically impossible. The highest aspiration of morality, its absolute end, and the only way to truly achieve Perpetual Peace, is not a kingdom of ends but ending animal kingdom, all animals, as soon as possible, and for good.

For World Vegan Day held today, we wish to refer to Peter Singer’s disappointment, expressed in Animal Liberation Now: The Definitive Classic Renewed, published earlier this year, that his “call for a boycott of meat has been a dismal failure“.

Singer writes:
“If avoiding factory farm products is a form of boycott, then what do we do if the boycott isn’t working? That question has to be asked, because since I called on readers to boycott meat in the first edition of this book, worldwide consumption of meat has increased from 112 million tons to more than 300 million tons, with virtually all of the additional meat coming from factory farms. A large part of that increase is due to the world’s population having doubled in size during that period, and most of the rest is the result of an otherwise welcome reduction in poverty, especially in Asia. Meat is expensive, and so people consume it only when they can afford to do so.
China’s per capita meat consumption tripled between 1990 and 2021, and Vietnam’s quadrupled over the same period, while there were also sharp increases in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, and South Africa. Countries that were already affluent in 1990 did not have such a clear trend, with moderate increases in Australia, Israel, Norway, and Japan, more modest increases in the United Kingdom and United States, and decreases in Canada, New Zealand, and Switzerland.”

Singer’s question is painful but necessary. It’s very difficult for us activists to acknowledge that the movement we are part of, all the effort that was put in, the life work of so many, is failing. It’s painful to admit that activists rely on small achievements missing the bigger picture and fail to recognize the mechanism.

Obviously we are not arguing that Animal Liberation didn’t positively affect the scale of suffering in the world. Of course it did. But undoubtedly the world since Animal Liberation is one in which there are many more suffering sentient beings who suffer even more.

Since 1975 new exploitation practices have been formed, joining the ones that already existed and constantly expand. Many countries have added more species to the list of “exploitable animals” (ones who weren’t subjected to commercial exploitation in these regions before), and further intensify their exploitation all the time. The prices got cheaper and cheaper and a greater variety of available products was introduced to the market.

Singer mentions some positive changes as well, such as the EU regulations in the egg, veal calves and pig’s flesh industries. However, as we elaborated in the articles about the Egg industry, the veal calves industry, and the pig’s flesh industry, these regulations are actually far from the titles and statements of ending some of the cruelest practices common in these industries, and it is certainly far from what activists hoped for, and it is most certainly extremely far from what the victims want and need.
Singer also mentions the European Citizens Initiative called “End the Cage Age” which was eventually dropped as we detailed in our former post.

Every year, additional tens of millions of sentient beings are born into a life of suffering. Every day is worse than the one before. Our website is full of facts and figures about suffering in the world, but the worst ones are the mentioned acute per capita increase, and that every second 5 more human babies are born. This world is so horrible that one of the greatest suffering factors is the human birth rate.

Apathy not ignorance

Singer decided to update and revision the two more informative chapters of the book, the one about animal experiments and the one about factory farming.
One immediate terrible thing about these chapters is that all the horrors that were practiced in 1975 are still common nowadays. The other depressing thing about it is the false belief that people keep supporting animal abuse because they are unaware of the details.

While it’s true that still most people aren’t exposed to what the animals go through in factory farms, they are aware of the basic facts. Humans don’t have to know every detail about the cruelest exploitation system ever in history, it is enough to generally know that factory farms exist to be morally accountable.

And it is even more basic than that, humans know that meat is animals’ flesh. Even the least informed humans are at least aware that meat is made of animals who were murdered specifically to make the meat they eat. They are aware of at least that, and still freely choose to participate. They know that animals are born to be killed for their flesh. Meat is never made of animals who died of diseases, accidents, by other nonhuman animals, or of old age, but only of animals that other humans murdered. So humans are not only fully aware of animals being murdered for their meat, murder is an obligatory condition for a corpse to be considered as meat. Humans know meat is murder. Knowing that they participate in hurting nonhumans is sufficient for them to stop. Humans consume animal products because they want to, not because they don’t know better.

The only thing that at least some humans can honestly say is that they didn’t know the extent of how horrible animals’ lives actually are. But the basic fact that meat is a piece of carcass, should definitely be sufficient to at least ignite basic curiosity and motivation to look for more information, if humans cared. However, humans don’t even try to figure out what happens to nonhumans before they become their meat. Extensive information is available for everyone nowadays, and activists are more than willing to explain to everyone what is going on and what they can do about it. So even saying that they didn’t know how horrible animals are treated, is less a case of lack of knowledge, and more a case of lack of caring.

Humans know enough to at least start asking questions. But they don’t want to know more, or know but don’t want to think about it. And when someone knows but doesn’t want to know more or doesn’t want to think about it, s/he doesn’t care. The problem is not ignorance, but apathy.

The argument that ‘the problem is that people don’t know what is going on’ is quite popular among activists since the counter assumption is deeply depressing. It is very discouraging to internalize that humans know but don’t care enough to stop, or that humans choose to eat meat fully aware of the fact that it is made of animals (and maybe even because it is made of animals). Clearly it is more empowering for activists to believe that humans are basically and naturally compassionate, and they are doing horrible things as a result of deceit and manipulations, as it is the hardest thing to make others care about something they don’t really care about. Raising awareness and informing humans is the relatively easy task, making others care about something to the point of changing their beloved habits, is a whole different story. So of course believing that humans are not doing the bad things they do because they want to, but because they don’t know better, is a much more comforting position than that they know what’s going on and do it anyway.

Humans know meat is a corpse of an animal that was raised and murdered for them. They see animals in all kinds of situations during their lives, in farms when driving outside the city, inside crowded trucks when driving on highways, dead but in a relatively whole and unprocessed state in markets, alive in the case of fish and crustaceans in markets and even restaurants, and of course in the last couple of decades in the movement’s publications, on TV, and online. People know what’s going on. They just don’t care enough to do something about it.

Nowadays, more and more humans, in more and more places are exposed to more and more of the violence from factory farms by activists who face them with the truth. But the reaction of most is not a moral repugnance, but mainly avoidance from any ethical consideration. Most don’t want to watch violence towards animals, but to keep enjoying the “products” of it.
If slaughterhouses had glass walls, almost everyone would look away from the violent sight and keep eating animals flesh.

Rise to the challenge

Singer writes:
“I am often asked if, when I first wrote Animal Liberation, I expected it to have the success that it has had. The truth is that I didn’t know what to expect. On the one hand, the core argument I was putting forward seemed so irrefutable, so undeniably right, that I thought everyone who read it would surely be convinced by it and would tell their friends to read it, and therefore everyone would stop eating meat and demand changes to our treatment of animals. On the other hand, in the 1970s, few people took issues concerning animals seriously. That speciesist attitude could have meant that the book would be ignored. If I succeeded in getting some attention, I was aware that the huge industries that exploit animals would fight against ideas that threatened their existence. Could rational and ethical arguments make headway against such powerful opposition? Alas, I thought, probably not.

What happened falls between these two opposing scenarios. Yes, there are more vegetarians and vegans than there were in 1975, and some of the reforms mentioned in this chapter have improved the lives of hundreds of millions of animals. On the other hand, there are now more animals suffering in laboratories and factory farms than ever before. We need much more radical changes than we have seen so far.

The animals themselves are incapable of demanding their own liberation, of protesting against their condition with rallies, votes, civil disobedience, or boycotts, or even of thanking those who advocate on their behalf. We humans have the power to continue to oppress other species forever, or until we make ourselves extinct. Will our tyranny continue, proving that morality counts for nothing when it clashes with self-interest, as many cynics have always said? Or will we rise to the challenge and prove our capacity for genuine altruism by ending our ruthless exploitation of the species over which we have power, not because we are forced to do so by rebels or terrorists, but because we recognize that our position is morally indefensible? I believe that this recognition will come, eventually, because over the past millennium we have made progress in expanding the sphere of those to whom we extend equal consideration. I do not know how long it will take for us to include nonhuman animals within this sphere, nor how many trillions of animals will continue to suffer until that happens. The way in which you and other readers respond to this book can shorten that time, and reduce that number.”

It’s time to open our eyes and admit that human society is irrevocably speciesist. So far there is every reason to believe that even within the human race, selfishness and discrimination will never be overcome. Anthropologists have never discovered a human society free of violence, and social psychology findings indicate that elements such as group patriotism, selfishness, obedience, conformism, tendency to discriminate, as well as biases, irrational and irrelevant factors when it comes to moral thinking, are all innate to a great extent.

Conventional advocacy, or, asking the torturers if they are willing to stop torturing, is basically and principally speciesist in itself.
Despite that theoretically activists absolutely oppose humans’ dominance, they practically accept it by asking humans to change their violent ways. They all know what happens every time they fail to convince them.

Among themselves, activists point out that the animal holocaust is much worse than any human holocaust in history, however, the partisan fighters in the second world war didn’t organize leafleting events to stop the massacre.

Animal liberation activists’ natural tendency and the first and last plan of action, is to explain to humans that their daily torturing of the weaker for their own minor benefits, habits and pleasures is wrong, and that in itself is wrong, violent and speciesist. It indicates how human oriented the moral scope is, and how inherently limited the discussion is.

Advocacy, today’s go-to option, must be realized for what it is – an extreme compromise at animals’ expense . Advocacy shouldn’t be the obvious starting point. You start by aiming for the best, most radical option and only if it turns out to be irrelevant should you turn to such a desperate compromise as working towards a world with as many vegans as possible.

And even if many consider going vegan, and even if all go vegan, the absolutely delusional option of a vegan world can be reversed at some point in the future. And even if it won’t, this world would still be a very violent one. The chances that the animal liberation movement would stop all the suffering are zero, not only because of the current consumption trends and the extremely depressing forecasts of the future, but because there are so many suffering factors that the movement doesn’t address, and so many suffering factors that the movement probably can’t even theoretically address.

The solution the AR movement is offering – veganism, the one that even in the more progressive parts of the world many activists believe it’s strategically unwise to ask for, is actually a systematic global oppression operation, abusing countless numbers of animals.
The main reason activists hardly ever address this massive black hole is because everything pales in comparison to factory farming, and also because most automatically go on the defensive when meat eaters cynically make this point.
But we are not meat eaters, we are vegans too. We are vegans because it is the least horrible option. But more than we are vegans, we are activists, and as such we are looking for a truly moral solution. Veganism isn’t.

The long list of vegan options you gladly offer those you’re trying to convince to consider stopping their personal part in the torture, is substituting extremely horrible things with much less horrible things. But they are not at all cruelty free options. Plant based diet is cruel. The fact that there are diets that are much crueler doesn’t make it moral.

Apart from the agricultural stage, the manufacture of products that are considered basic vegan food such as soy milk, flour, tofu, bread, oil, tea and etc. can include dozens of harmful sub-processes like: Cleaning and removing unwanted parts such as the outer layers (for example, separating the beans from the pod), extracting the interior (such as seeds), mixing and macerating (as in preserved fruits and vegetables), liquefaction and pressing (as in fruit juices and plant milk production), fermentation (like in soy sauces and tempeh), baking, boiling, broiling, frying, steaming, shipping of a number of ingredients from different distances, wrapping, labeling, packing, transportation of waste, and of course the transportation to the stores. All these stages are invisible as the finished product lies on the shelf.

And don’t get this criticism wrong, it is not about activists’ diets, it is about activists’ activism. We are not criticizing activists for being hypocrite because they cause suffering. We know it is inevitable and that’s the whole point. Even the most caring and compassionate, non-speciesist humans on this planet are bound to participate in a violent system, systematically hurting creatures they wholeheartedly believe they mustn’t. There is no nonviolent option in this world.

Most humans haven’t even made much more basic ethical decisions. There is no magic formula to educate most humans to solve conflicts without violence, to not objectify each other, to not discriminate each other on the basis of race, gender, ethnical orientation, class, weight, height, looks and etc., so what are the odds of convincing them all to become vegans?

Humans prove again and again that their profits, taste preference, convenience, entertainment and etc., are much more important to them than morality. Most of them are not even willing to hear the facts and listen to the arguments, not to mention stop financing animal abuse.

Even when the animal rights movement gives up on the idea of developing care towards nonhuman animals, and turns to anthropocentric and egoistic advocacy – such as trying to appeal to humans’ selfish concerns like care for their children’s future by using “the environmental argument”, or care for their own kind by using “the hunger argument”, or care  for themselves  by using “the health argument” (the hopelessness summit) – it doesn’t really change humans, as they are too egoistic and self-centered. Even the most anthropocentric and self-involved arguments are failing.

Even when activists consider humans’ self-centered character and their ethical frailty and promote initiatives such as Meatless Mondays or Veganurary, corporate outreach, and further development of various flesh “alternatives” – all indications of how activists gave up on humans’ care for animals – it doesn’t lead to any real change.

Even when the animal rights movement reaches the lowest point it is not enough.

The animal rights arguments are so simple and right. They are based on solid facts and evidences. Nobody can confront them rationally. The fact that the arguments are so strong and so well-based but still fail again and again, is the exact thing that should wake you all. Animal rights activists shouldn’t draw strength from their strong arguments but the other way around. When arguments that are so strong and so obvious don’t work there is something wrong with the addressees.

If you act to change humans the maximum you can theoretically achieve is more vegans. But if you act to annihilate humanity, the maximum you can achieve is the termination of the incomparably most oppressive, violent, and harmful species in the history of this planet. Isn’t that goal worth devoting your life for? Can you think of anything better to do with the one life that you have than trying to do everything you can so that if you succeed human tyranny would end for good?

We are not delusional activists. We are well aware of how little the chances to stop all the suffering are. However morally that’s what we aspire for and what we think every activist should aspire for. As long as there is a theoretical chance to stop all the suffering we mustn’t compromise. We must search for ways to do it as hard and complicated as it is, and as long as it takes. Especially since the conventional movement’s chances are not an option even theoretically.
The more activists join this ambitious effort, the greater the chances of the suffering to end. Rise to the challenge.

In the former part of this series of posts reviewing the book The End of Animal Farming we have addressed the factor of the supposed expanding moral circle. In the following post, which is the last part of the series, we’ll address the factor of technological developments in the animal-free food systems, as well as some additional moral concerns that Reese brings up other than animal farming.

The Expanding Technological Circle

The last but not least factor in Reese’s predication of the end of animal farming is the technological developments in the animal-free food systems, or in his words ‘The Rise of Vegan Tech’.
Reese elaborates about the abundance of companies and investments in the field of plant-based technology aiming at developing products similar, and even identical to animal based products.

However, the success and abundance of these companies is also worrying.
That is, first of all, because some of these companies have already developed and are marketing, for several years now, plant based products so similar to animal based products that humans are left with no culinary excuses anymore, and yet they don’t stop consuming animal based products. Many humans are not even willing to try plant based products that numerous people say taste exactly the same as the ones they refuse to replace.

The fact that the list of excuses to consume animal products is getting shorter and shorter, and that the list of reasons to go vegan is getting longer and longer, yet veganism is still a very marginal phenomenon, is very worrying. If some could have said in the past that the problem with veganism is that people feel that they have nothing to eat (wrongfully obviously), and that they don’t want to eat leaves, tofu and nuts all day, every day (if we ignore for the sake of the argument that that’s not what vegans used to eat, and of how cruel and speciesist it is to support animal abuse just because humans don’t want to eat leaves, tofu and nuts every day), nowadays these claims can’t be made anymore. In many places around the world, especially western countries, vegan culinary is so developed that it’s sometimes literally impossible to tell apart the plant based foods from the ones made of the carcasses or bodily fluids of animals, yet veganism is still a marginal phenomenon.

Never before did humans need “to give up” so little, so not to actively support industrial animal abuse, but still, the utterly vast majority maintain their violent and oppressive habits, perhaps except for switching one meal on Mondays.

Not the enormous food waste, not the enormous water waste, not the enormous pollution, not climate change, not obesity, not diabetes, and not the risk of a heart attack or cancer, and now not even when it is the same product with the same look, texture and taste, have made veganism mainstream.

Reese asks a supposedly rhetorical question: “isn’t it harder to take down the multibillion-dollar meat, dairy, and egg industries than to inspire them to switch their production to animal-free versions?” And the answer is seemingly yes, but that depends on humans’ consumption habits. And so we can raise a similar question about humans: isn’t it harder to convince all humans to stop supporting animal abuse for the sake of nonhuman animals, than to inspire them to switch their consumption to animal-free versions for the health benefits they would personally gain and because otherwise they are harming, polluting and depleting the only planet they can currently live in, all the more so now that they can have all their beloved products without all these harmful consequences? Well, evidently it is not that simple.

Despite that the cruel products humans like so much, are available nowadays in a non-cruel version, the vast majority still choose cruelty. More and more don’t, but their share is still marginal, certainly compared with the expectation, since if it was truly a matter of taste, now that humans can have their favorite food made with no animal flesh, there shouldn’t be any dilemma. And for most indeed there isn’t. They want animal flesh.

Obviously the more similar plant based products would be to animal based ones, the more humans would consume them, but the problem was never merely the taste. Evidently, many humans who have smugly stated in the past that veggie burgers are disgusting, have never tasted, smelled or even saw one. Blindfold taste tests have proven long ago that most humans can’t even tell the difference between animal based and plant based products, not to mention find the later disgusting. And that proves that in many senses, humans are eating symbols, not food.

Every new plant based product that successfully imitates an animal derived one, doesn’t prove that there is no culinary need for any animal based product, but the opposite. It is not by chance that the most popular plant based burgers are also the ones who “bleed”. And it is not by chance that many humans want their food to bleed, or that they find plant based “meat” products disgusting before they have tasted, smelled or seen them. It is the symbol attached to these products that disgust them, and it is the symbol attached to animals’ flesh that attracts many of them.

As previously argued, food is not a mere energy source. And meat particularly, is very unique among foods. All along history and to this very day meat has been very highly valued by humans, by almost every single culture. Meat’s value is uncomparable to any other food, and is in no proportion to its nutritional significance, therefore, in his book Meat: A Natural Symbol the anthropologist Nick Fiddes suggests that this special status of meat results from the fact that it embodies humans’ dominance over nature and the other animals. Animals symbolize power and nature, and so eating other animals is the ultimate symbol of humans’ power, of their superiority over other animals, and their triumph over nature.
Meat is a dominance and power symbol and humans take pleasure in the power and the predominance, as well as in the taste. Obviously nowadays they can get the same taste from equivalent plant based products, and they can most definitely get the required nutrients from other sources, but the social aspects of meat eating are much stronger and much more significant than its nutritional values, and even its taste.
Meat’s symbolism is far from being the only reason humans eat meat, but it is definitely a significant one, and so it is highly important to acknowledge it.

Food is deeply imprinted in human society and culture, so just asking humans to switch the animal derived raw materials of their food to a plant based one, even if it has the same look, texture and of course taste, for many it is not enough.
If eating animal based products was only a preferable energy source, then it would have been much easier to convince humans to simply change it, especially once there are culinary equivalent options. But no matter how many times vegans are telling humans that converting their diets into a vegan one is only a raw-material swap, clearly it is not at all just that. It is a much more profound step, for most a self-determination one. Veganism is not a raw-material swap since food is not fuel.

Plant based “alternatives” are on the market for years now. The most selfish, cruelest and despicable excuse non-vegans are using – nothing tastes like the “real thing” – should have already been defeated, since some plant based products do look, feel, cook and taste like meat. But it is not happening.

It is very good that there are plant based products in regular supermarkets, and it is encouraging in the sense that they have not been there up until recently and now there are plenty. Notwithstanding, despite that all these vegan options are available in many places, they are still surrounded by non-vegan ones. So activists can be encouraged and draw optimism from the fact that there are plant based burgers along with flesh burgers in the meat aisles, but in the same breath they must ask why the hell are there still flesh burgers when there are equivalently tasty plant based burgers right next to them? How careless to other sentient beings’ suffering must someone be to still choose the flesh burgers? There is nothing encouraging about the fact that humans choose again and again the cruel options over the amazing variety of the vegan ones.
How apathetic must humans be to enter Burger King or McDonalds, see the veggie burger option, and order the one who was made with fear, pain, agony, boredom and despair?

The fact that humans have never had to “give up” less than they do now thanks to the abundant plant based products, which are amazingly similar to animal based products, but they still choose the violent versions, is a reason for worry not a cause for optimism.

When humans run out of excuses as to why they don’t stop consuming animal based products but they still don’t, activists run out of excuses as to why they still insist on trying to convince them to stop instead of making them stop.

The second worry we find important to mention in that relation might sound too theoretical if not purist, but we think it is concrete, and it is relevant to mention it here, especially considering that, as we’ll elaborate later, Reese himself mentions sources of enormous suffering, current and potential, other than animal farming.

Accepting that the only way to bring about the end of animal farming is by giving humans what they desire, because as Reese argues – “As humanity gains unprecedented technological power such as a deep understanding of cell and tissue biology, we will be able to create meat, dairy, eggs, leather, and other products without the metabolic waste of biological processes like movement and brainpower.” and that: “The system’s fundamental inefficiency will end animal farming one day, regardless of our concern for animals, the environment, or human health” – is obviously not really challenging the confines of humans’ moral circle, not to mention breaking them as we should, and it is perpetuating speciesism.
And don’t get this point wrong, again, this is not coming from moral purity. Had it truly been the only option, and had it truly been a certain option, an inclusive option that could have solved all of humans’ caused suffering, and forever, then we would agree this should be the way to go. But considering that it is not the only option, that it is not certain, that it is not inclusive, that it is not forever, and far from being able to solve all the suffering humans are causing, this is not a desirable solution, but a cruel and speciesist compromise. And this cruel and speciesist compromise has and would have dire consequences, on the animals exploited as part of animal farming, and as we’ll mention later, on various other dimensions.

Starting with animals exploited as part of animal farming.
Reese predicts that animal farming would end at about 2100. That is according to many, a very optimistic prediction considering the human race. But even if it happens to be so, in the 80 years until then, based on the number of victims of animal farming nowadays (not including fishing), and considering that some of it would gradually decline along the years on the one hand, while the human population would increase, and that animal consumption would increase in many developing countries in the following decades on the other hand, and it is probable that about12 trillion, that is 12,000 billion nonhuman animals would be tortured by humans, in farms alone, not including fishing, and not including every other way that humans are hurting nonhumans. And that immense number is according to the rather optimistic prediction…

Reese argues that he doesn’t want to treat animals any different than humans, but would he accept similar activistic methods as the ones he suggested along the book in case tomorrow morning about 8 billion creatures from another planet would land here, imprison all humans, rapidly and intensively breed them in farms to the point that there are over one hundred billion farmed humans more than ten times the number of the creatures from the other planet, at every moment? I doubt that in such a case he would suggest waiting for all the aliens to realize that there are better, more efficient ways to achieve what they desire rather than exploiting humans.

It is speciesist to focus on trying to give humans what they desire so that hopefully, maybe, someday in the future, it would reduce only some of the suffering they are causing, and it is speciesist to suggest waiting so that hopefully, maybe, someday in the future, humanity will be willing to settle for these options.

The human race is a cruel and dangerous species and it has proven this time and again throughout its history.
As earlier mentioned, claims about a decline in violence have been refuted in the series of reviews of Steven Pinker’s famous book. Violence in the world has increased along history not the other way around. Contemplating about the last century being the most violent ever to humans, is sufficient to realize that, not to mention that each century has shown an increase in violence towards nonhumans, especially the last ones.

We don’t really expand humans’ moral circle by providing them with what they desire only by non-cruel means. It is like giving the bully exactly what he wants only by somehow providing technical protection for most of its victims. This is great for most of its victims, and had it been the only option, clearly we would have supported that. But the bully has many other victims, and many other ways to bully others. And there is no way to prevent all the suffering that it causes. And given its problematic character, we can never know what he would cause in the future.

However, there are already some possible frightening options and current alarming dimensions in that regard. And Reese mentions some of them in a sub-topic he calls Looking Forward.

Not Looking Forward

The first dimension Reese mentions is time:
“Researchers have estimated that in the long run there could be 1038 humans (and even more animals) if humanity colonizes the Virgo Supercluster, the massive concentration of galaxies that includes our own Milky Way galaxy and forty-seven thousand of its neighbors. Interstellar expansion presents a tremendous opportunity for a progressive society to expand and flourish, but it’s also a terrifying risk for the expansion of inequity, persecution, slavery, war, torture, genocide, and every other tragedy that’s happened on Earth.”

The second one is potential danger associated with artificial intelligence:
“One technology that could have a critical impact on the well-being of humans and animals in the far future is artificial intelligence (AI), so one way we could have an impact on the far future is through AI safety, working to ensure that AI has positive rather than negative effects on the world. One troubling scenario is if AI progresses slowly toward human-level intelligence, but then due to its ability to quickly improve upon itself, suddenly overtakes even the smartest human minds. Evolutionary processes took billions of years to shape modern biological intelligences, but a sufficiently advanced technology could modify itself, test those modifications, and learn to improve itself as dramatically in mere moments. It might be tempting to assume that humans would have total control over the AI’s goals or to dismiss negative outcomes as science fiction, but experts in the field see value alignment—whether or not AI will have the same values as humans—as a very tricky problem, especially given factors like the competition between companies and countries to be the first ones to develop such a superintelligence.”

The third one is not futuristic but is as ancient as sentience and that is of course the suffering of wild animals:
“They endure injury, illness, and starvation with astonishing frequency. Yet there has so far been very little research into or advocacy for large-scale interventions to improve their welfare, despite extremely large-scale impacts of humanity on their welfare through transportation, agriculture, and building construction. It’s not a question of whether we should intervene in the wild, but whether we should continue with our current haphazard approach.
To be clear, what we’re considering here is more than just conservation of natural habitat. Instead, it’s the idea of actually intervening in nature to improve the welfare and protect the autonomy of individual wild animals who suffer intensely and in vast numbers.”

And we couldn’t agree more about how enormous, urgent and neglected suffering in nature is.

The fourth dimension he mentions is also not futuristic but is as ancient as sentience, and that is human relation to bugs:
“bugs—a term I’m using to refer to all the small invertebrates like insects, spiders, and earthworms—are frequent subjects of academic inquiry, including from neuroscientists and biologists who have studied their nervous systems and behavior. I won’t dive all the way back into a discussion of sentience, but it’s safe to say that bugs show many of the behaviors we associate with sentience in our own lives, such as fleeing from danger and moving toward food. The best explanation for these actions is that they are driven by emotions like those you experience when you perform the same actions, such as fear in the case of fleeing danger, and excitement in the case of approaching a tasty meal. Many bugs even show reinforcement learning, the ability to seek out or avoid an outcome based on previous experiences.”

Having said that, he argues: “bugs could still face significant human-caused suffering, if, for instance, insect-based foods increase in popularity. When I go to conferences and events on the future of food, insect protein is a frequent discussion topic, and there are certainly plenty of foodies who see a big role for it in the future of food. While I appreciate that this food system could reduce some of the harms of conventional animal farming, such as greenhouse gas pollution, the number of insects that would need to suffer and die for a pound of protein is many times the number of cows and pigs, and even fish and chickens. This should make us cautious about a switch to insect consumption because of the greater number of animals involved.”

The last concerning dimension he mentions is artificial sentience, that is sentient beings who are nonnatural, meaning that instead of evolving the way humans and other animals have, they are adapted or created by humans or other intelligent beings: “If we do create sentient machines, which many scientists see as a legitimate possibility, we could see these beings being subjected to an immense amount of suffering. Less powerful digital minds could be treated as lower classes, similar to how humans today treat animals as tools and property. In fact, if digital sentience emerges, we could see brand-new social movements emerge with these machines to fight against their oppression, just as we’ve seen for biological victims.”

All these concerns, some of which already exist, and some are speculative but astronomical in their suffering potential, only further strengthen the argument that we need not focus on convincing humanity to end animal farming, but on ending sentient beings’ suffering, all the suffering, of all the sentient beings, the ones who already exist and are suffering, and the ones who might one day exist and will suffer, regardless of humans’ position about it.

Convincing humanity to seriously address all these issues, when it is so far from solving so many historical problems among its own species, is absolutely ridiculous.
We believe that the way humans treat members of their own species is the strongest indication of how hopeless the chance to create a moral change in human society based on humans’ morality is. Please take the time and read our articles and posts about how humans systematically exploit the poorest of their own kind, how they treat half of their own species and their own posterity. Of course it shouldn’t matter to which species someone belongs, but it does matter to them, and still, this is how they treat each other.

It is impossible to educate most humans not to use one another, not to objectify each other, not to turn to violence in conflicts and crises so easily, not to discriminate each other on the basis of race, gender, ethnical orientation, class, weight, height, looks and etc.
The homo-consumericus knowingly and systematically oppresses members of its own species for the most trivial material goods. The dynamics of psychologically repressing and soothing any uncomfortable thought about the numerous faceless human victims half way around the world that pay a huge price so that consumers wouldn’t have to make the slightest compromise on their lifestyle, is very characteristic of the human race. The ease in which humans conduct horrendous acts towards one another is proven again and again by social-science (particularly psychology studies), by history, and by daily affairs.

It is even hard to imagine a world without wars, hunger, poverty, racism, chauvinism, and a slavery free world, so one in which humans are taking seriously moral issues that don’t regard them, or don’t regard them yet, is delusional.

In fact, Reese himself feels the need to convince his readers that even the plight of animals in farms is so compelling an issue, and therefore suggests to consider the following three facts:
“First, there are over one hundred billion farmed animals alive at this moment—more than ten times the number of humans. Second, over 90 percent (over 99 percent in the US) of these animals live on industrial, large-scale “factory farms” enduring atrocious cruelty such as intense confinement in tiny cages, brutal mutilation and slaughter methods, and rampant disease and suffering from artificial breeding for excessive production of meat, dairy, and eggs. Third, today we have scientific consensus that these are sentient beings with the capacity to feel great joy and suffering”.

We think these three facts alone, not to mention many others, are sufficient to convince activists that the problem is not in the way they are approaching humans but that approaching humans is the only way they can think of confronting the suffering in the world.
Activists’ natural tendency and the first and last plan of action, is to explain to humans that their daily torturing of the weaker for their own minor benefits, habits and pleasures is wrong, and that in itself is wrong, violent and speciesist. It indicates how human oriented the moral scope is, and how limited the discussion is.

All activists are aware of the fact that much more violence is inflicted in factory farms than the violence that would be required to overthrow the human tyrants. So why letting way more than a trillion victims per year (including marine animals from all kinds of commercial fishing) to suffer until less than 8 billion humans are willing to consume the same products without the cruelty?

We doubt that if animals could, they would choose to wait until all humans decide to end their daily torture. This issue reveals how the animal liberation movement, the only group representing the animals, is filled with anthropocentric perspectives, talking and thinking in humans’ terms.

Our goal is that the human annihilation option becomes an acknowledged activism option. Our hope is that it would become activists’ first option. In fact, it must. When faced with the historical, systematical and inherent human dominion over nonhumans, stopping all humans from causing all their harms for good, is what should be our goal, and thinking how we can do that is where we must start. Advocacy, today’s go-to option, must be realized for what it is – an extreme compromise at animals’ expense. Advocacy shouldn’t be the obvious starting point. You start by aiming for the best, most radical option – the one that can end all the suffering in the world, and only if it turns out to be irrelevant should you turn to other options such as acting so that maybe someday there would no longer be animal farms in the world as this book suggests, or trying to convince as many people as possible not to consume animal based products as many other activists suggest. Even a totally vegan world (which is totally unrealistic) is a horrible world as we thoroughly explain in the article Vegan Suffering and in the article occupied territory.
A non-speciesist approach should lead you to first consider the best option for the nonhuman animals, which is stopping this inherently violent and speciesist world by any means necessary.

In the former part of this series of posts reviewing the book The End of Animal Farming we have addressed the factor of the inefficiency of animal farming. In the following we’ll address the factor of the expanding moral circle.

The Expanding Excuses

Some of Reese’s optimism is based on his agreement with the notion that the world is getting better and that humans are becoming less violent. He mentions Steven Pinker’s book The Better Angels of Our Nature, and agrees with him that “our increasing concern for animals is a particularly strong reason for optimism that the general trend in violence will continue downwards in the future.”
This is a very important issue, however, since we have thoroughly addressed Steven Pinker’s theory in our review of The Better Angels of Our Nature we will not repeat our arguments here but suggest you to read them all, especially the two about nonhuman animals.
Instead, we wish to focus on what seems to be the main source of Reese’s optimism regarding humans’ concern for animals. He often cites the following results of a US survey: “A 2014 US survey found that 93 percent of respondents felt it was “very important” to buy their food from humane sources. Eighty-seven percent believe “farmed animals have roughly the same ability to feel pain and discomfort as humans.” And an astounding 47 percent of US adults say in a survey that they support the seemingly radical policy change of “a ban on slaughterhouses.””

Reese is aware of the huge gap between supposedly half of US adults supporting a ban on slaughterhouses, and only about 5% of them being vegetarians (we’ll ignore for the sake of the argument that vegetarians actively support slaughterhouses given that chickens in the egg industry, and cows in the milk industry, let alone their claves, are murdered in slaughterhouses as well). His explanation for this gap is that humans want to be vegetarian but just don’t know how.
Apparently Reese is unaware of the huge gap between what humans are willing to state they support in a non-binding survey, and what they are willing to support practically in their everyday lives.
The reason many humans are making these statements is that humans like to feel good about themselves, especially when all they need to do to achieve that feeling is making empty statements. And making themselves feel good is also the reason why they are not practically stopping their active support in the very same slaughterhouses they state should be banned, as unfortunately consuming animal based food is making humans feel very good.

Reese sarcastically writes that: “Every grassroots farmed animal advocate I’ve asked about this topic has spoken with many people who insist that the meat they buy doesn’t come from factory farms. “I only eat humane meat,” they say, defending themselves from the activists’ critiques of factory farming. This is one of the most common justifications heard by grassroots advocates.” And points out how obviously very unlikely these common justifications are: “a survey my colleagues and I conducted in 2017 suggested that 75 percent of US adults say they usually consume humane animal products, which seems impossible given that the best estimates suggest less than 1 percent of US farmed animals live on nonfactory farms.” And these people, like the ones in the formerly mentioned survey, are simply interested in seeming good, they are not interested in bothering themselves with actually being good (or in this case avoid being bad). And the reason is very simple, merely sounding good doesn’t cost them a thing while actively supporting their statement comes with what they view as a price. They don’t mind making a statement as long as they don’t need to actually do something about it.

Reese argues that “When people call upon the idea of ethical animal farming—even if that constitutes little or none of their actual consumption—we can think of it as a “psychological refuge” they’re using to justify their consumption of factory farmed products. This refuge shelters them from the cognitive dissonance they would feel if they both fully considered their ethical views and the realities of their consumption choices. It’s one of the biggest roadblocks to fixing our food system, perhaps even more harmful than the four N’s.”
And we agree, only that the same goes for the other surveys he mentions. Humans’ completely empty statements regarding nonhumans’ ability to feel pain and discomfort as humans, and a ban on slaughterhouses, also function as a “psychological refuge”. Making these statements places them on the right side in their view, despite that they are actively enforcing the wrong one, several times a day, every day. All are “psychological refuge” and none truly represent their true position about nonhuman animals, which practically, is mostly cruel indifference.

Reese argues that a large part of the explanation for this gap, and for the problem in general, is that people are far more willing to support institutional change than they are to change their individual consumption. And again he tries to back this argument with surveys: “US adults consistently show over 70 percent poll support for various changes in farmed animal welfare, such as cage-free, slower-growth chicken genetics, higher-welfare slaughter methods, and an end to extreme crowding. There have also been consistent majority votes in favor of farmed animal welfare ballot initiatives. This widespread support contrasts with the tiny number of consumers who actually opt for these higher-welfare products in their individual consumption: organic meat made up just 1.5 percent of conventional fresh red meat sales in the US and grass-fed 0.9 percent in 2016.
Our 2017 poll also found that a whopping 97 percent of respondents agree with the statement “Whether to eat animals or be vegetarian is a personal choice, and nobody has the right to tell me which one they think I should do.” I cannot stress enough how resistant people are to individual consumer change, especially when it’s as closely tied to personal identity as vegetarianism and veganism are in the US public consciousness.”

As mentioned earlier, there are more ways to explain these surveys results, but even if we’ll ignore them for the sake of the argument, the claims in the first paragraph don’t exactly settle with the claim in the second, because if humans unequivocal statement is that eating animals or being a vegetarian is a personal choice, and “nobody has the right to tell me which one they think I should do”, then how can it be that the best way to change their habits is not that activists – people like them and who have no air of authority – would convince them, but rather that authoritative institutions, would change their habits for them?

In fact he himself gives an example that contradicts this assertion: “Chinese consumers eat around 173 grams of meat per day, but the government recommends only 40 to 75 grams—less than an average American hamburger patty. China has a highly centralized governance system, which makes policy change more difficult, but also makes changes easier to promulgate across the country. Meat has been regarded as a luxury, but it also hasn’t been as associated with Chinese cultural identity the same way bacon, cheese, and bratwurst have in many American and European cultures.”
If even one of the most centralized governance system in the world fails to change people’s consumption habits, let alone in a nation that meat is not associated with its cultural identity, how would that work in other nations? Why would other nations succeed where an incidentally and indirectly test case such as China is failing?

Finally for that matter, let’s get back to Reese’s explanation that the gap between the number of humans making these statements and the number of vegetarians is due to that humans want to be vegetarian but just don’t know how.
He writes that: “When advocates hand someone a leaflet on the street, show their friend a video of undercover investigations, or speak with a journalist about animal-free eating, the hesitation and counterarguments we hear are mostly about how they can change their behavior, not why they should. Common concerns include:

■ “I’m an athlete. Where would I get my protein?”

■ “It’s just so hard to find vegetarian options when eating out.”

■ “I would love to be vegan, but I could never give up cheese.”

It’s become increasingly less common over the past few years to hear arguments against changing to a non-meat diet such as:

■ “They’re just animals. They don’t matter.”

■ “Most farms aren’t like the ones in that investigation.”

■ “I only buy meat from humane farms.””

But these are not genuine concerns, they are poor excuses. There are many plant based options for any food imaginable nowadays, and the excusers know that. No one really believes in these “concerns”. It’s just that people need to say something when confronted with a moral truth, and they feel uncomfortable admitting their immoral truth, which is that they care more about their own marginal interests than they do about others’ most major interests.
Humans spit out such excuses since they find it easier to tackle the How than the Why.

And in any case, what is really behind all these excuses and many others of this kind, is anyway, eventually, practically, arguing that “They’re just animals. They don’t matter.” As who better than us, veteran vegans, knows that these are all nonsense. We have become vegans long before the current abundance and diversity of plant based food, before the abundance of information about what happens to animals in the food industry, before the abundance of information about human health, before the relative social acceptance and normality of veganism and etc., and still, we didn’t have a doubt for a single moment regarding the Why. So we figured out the How by ourselves. And that’s because for us nonhuman animals were never “just” animals, and they always mattered. If we easily figured out the How decades ago, surly humans can easily do so nowadays.
Obviously everybody knows how to stop their support in the cruelest system ever. And everybody knows why they should do so. The problem is not that people don’t know what’s going on. And it’s also not that they don’t know how to stop supporting it. Everybody knows how animal based products are made, or at least that they were made of animals, and that those animals didn’t volunteer to become their bacon and eggs. And everybody knows how to get plant based food nowadays. Neither is the main problem. The main problem is that humans don’t care enough to simply stop supporting animal abuse.

For the World Farm Animals Day held today, a critical review of the book The End of Animal Farming by Jacy Reese.
Reese’s argument, basically, is that considering the incredible inefficiency of animal farming, along with what he views as an expansion of humans’ moral circle, and the technological developments in the animal-free food systems, animal farming will end.
In the following three posts we’ll address each of these three main factors correspondingly.

The Dangers of the Inefficiency Argument

Reese repeatedly argues that one of the main reasons, if not the main one, that animal farming will end is that it doesn’t make rational sense:
“The ace in the hole for the inevitability of the end of animal farming is the incredible inefficiency of making meat, dairy, and eggs from animals. Farmed animals consume calories and nutrients from plants, and they use that energy to do a lot more than produce meat, dairy, and eggs. They have all the normal bodily functions like breathing, movement, and growing by-products like hoofs, organs, and hair. These processes mean farmed animals have a caloric conversion ratio of 10:1 or more. For every ten calories of food we feed them, we get only about one calorie of meat in return. And for every ten grams of plant-based protein, we get at most two grams of animal-based protein.”

However, in order for the claim that animal farming will end because in efficiency terms it is unreasonable, to be reasonable, humans need to consume food on reasonable basis, only that they don’t. Humans don’t choose their food on the basis of energy-efficiency, but according to many other factors. Humans eat for great many reasons, for reasons of community, rituals, family, expressing their identity by eating this and not that, and of course for pleasure. For billions of humans food is comfort, a gesture, entertainment, an enemy, a profession, a hobby, a weapon, it can break barriers, it defines cultures, and connects families. It involves so many taboos and determinations of who belongs to the group and who does not, it unifies and distinguishes between ethnic groups and cultures. Unfortunately food is much more than taste and nutrition. Looking for reason based on efficiency in humans’ eating habits is unreasonable.

For someone who is very familiar with humans’ various psychological biases, it is a bit strange that he ignores it in relation to food consumption. Humans don’t consume food on the basis of a rational caloric conversion ratio, or on a rational basis whatsoever, so this rational reason is far from being sufficient. Humans are not even consuming food on the basis of its nutritional value, health benefits, or environmental considerations, not to mention moral ones. They have a rather different list of priorities. They rather eat what they like, what they are used to, what is traditional, common, cheap, normal, what they have always eaten, what others around them are eating, food that defines them the way they wish to be defined, food that doesn’t distinguish them from the group they want to be part of, and etc. That’s why they are willing to invest what seems, on the face of it, as irrational efforts in the food they are eating.

Animal farming is still highly romanticized all around the world. Obviously for no good reason, yet that myth must be destroyed. Animal farming is not going to end merely because rationally speaking it is inefficient. For many humans around the world, following tradition is more rational than energy-efficiency. Food is not fuel for the body.

Exactly because food is not fuel but among many other things, a cultural and social indicator, there is a growing concern, that in many societies, and definitely in the US, animal based food would be associated with class and political stands. Meaning, that sadly, there is a high probability that many humans would choose whether or not to eat animal based products merely according to their political agenda. In other words, it is probable that consuming animals would be partisan based. It already is in many senses, but it might get worse. Veganism is already highly associated with the leftwing, this may happen to cultured meat as well. This is not a prediction but more of apprehension. And in any case not the point here. The point here is that food is far from being merely the way people energize themselves. Insisting that it is, in such an irrational world, makes his rational claim totally irrational.

Beyond the fact that humans’ preferred foods don’t reflect the energy-efficiency of their food system and so it is not very likely that the inefficiency claim would radically change the food system, there is a great danger in making the inefficiency claim.
That is since the arguer may raise a factual claim and control the practical conclusions s/he is extracting from it, however s/he has no control over the operative conclusions that others would make. In the energy-efficiency sense, since humans excel at resisting any substantial changes in their beloved habits, and tend to choose the least demanding option, the one that requires them to change their habits the least, it is more probable that if anything, they would choose the more “efficient” animal based options than the plant based one. In other words, and practically speaking, this means that some people would consider instead of devouring the corpses of cows and sheeps, to devour the ones of animals who are considered as more “efficient” such as chickens and fishes. Considering that fishes and chickens are much smaller than sheeps and cows, that means that more individual animals would be exploited and tortured by humans. So opposite to the original intention of this claim, it may be the case that it would bring about an unfortunate increase in the number of tortured animals in the food industry.

Eventually humans would do what they find convenient and pleasing. If we’ll tell them that animal farming is incredibly inefficient, as soon as they discover that the various industries are not equally inefficient, they are more likely to choose the less inefficient ones, and unfortunately choosing these ones means consuming more individual animals. And that is among the humans who would even consider changing their habits, most humans are practically totally indifferent to any consideration which is not selfish.

And Reese is aware of this implication. He even writes that “consuming smaller animals leads to far more suffering per calorie because it takes far more animals.”  So the inefficiency argument is not only a speciesist argument in the sense of suggesting an opposition to an extremely cruel industry based on its inefficiency rather than its cruelty to other animals, it is also a cruel argument in the sense of the high probability of increasing the number of individual victims. Humans have been consuming more cows, sheeps and pigs in the past than they do nowadays (percentage wise), and nowadays they consume much more chickens and fishes. Along with human health motives, efficiency, also played a role in that awful course.
Reese is enough of an optimist to think that this argument is bound to bring about the end of animal farming, however, so far, along with other human oriented arguments, it has been increasing the number of exploited nonhuman animals.

The efficiency issue doesn’t only increase the number of victims but also each victim’s suffering.
Overall, the main mean in making animal farming more “efficient” is making the exploited animals more “efficient” at converting feed to flesh, and bodily secretion. More product for less investment. That practically means more control over the animals by manipulating them and their surroundings. These methods include increased lighting, unnatural calorie-dense feed, antibiotic use, growth hormones, and of course – a manipulation which invades deep into the animals’ body by changing their genetic characteristics. Craving efficiency led to engineering animals who are deformed and crippled, with some organs extremely enlarged and others shriveled.

Chickens are the most extreme representatives of the industry’s ability to manipulate animals’ bodies in a way which fits the exploiters needs – convert feed more “efficiently”, and grow larger.
Recent campaigns calling for exploitation of chickens from less deformed breeds, wishing to somewhat reverse this extremely violent trend, face the industry’s cynical green-washed excuses about the supposed unsustainability of this call. The National Chicken Council emphases that such a move would result in the use of more environmental resources due to the increase in feed and water (resources which would ‘grow unprofitable body parts’), and due to the overall number of days it would take to raise the birds.
Some animal exploitation experts also admit that less crippled chickens, who suffer less pain with each step, tend to move around more and therefore waste more energy, which is less “efficient”.

So chickens, who are already the most numerous land victims on earth, which are bound to the severest genetic manipulation and to the harshest living conditions, will be even worse off.

Much like chickens, fishes also suffer from their reputation for being more “efficient”.
Similarly to land animals, today, more and more fishes are bred in factory farms, euphemistically called aquaculture. Of course, the controlled environment of a farm means more control over the fishes – and much more manipulation to make them grow faster, thus also be more “efficient”. From the moment they hatch, farmed fishes endure a lighting regime that tricks them to eat more of a commercial diet designed for weight-gain. They live in crowded tanks or sea cages where they often face aggression from other fishes they cannot escape, and have to fight for food. The density leads to disease outbreaks and parasites which lead to immense suffering.

These intensive conditions which produce more flesh from each fish are known to cripple them. About 50-60% of farmed salmon and trout were found to have damaged ear bones, which leads to drastic hearing impairments. Studies have identified this deformity to be the result of accelerated growth rates that were traced to high-nutrient feed and exposure to longer light periods. This illness has also been found in other farmed fish species such as carp, eel and red drum.

The pressure for rapid weight gain doesn’t end with external environmental intervention. In another horrid resemblance to land animals, fishes too are the subject of genetic manipulation to increase “efficiency”.
In 2015 the level of invasion into the fishes’ bodies took another turn for the worse, as for the first time the FDA approved the marketing of GM animal – Atlantic salmon who has a gene from a Chinook salmon and a promoter sequence from an ocean pout.
This salmon can grow twice as fast as conventionally farmed Atlantic salmons, reaching adult size in some 18 months compared to 30 months, and requiring 25% less feed.

So far, animal farming’s inefficiency, didn’t cause the industry to reconsider its practices, but to constantly push further and further the biological limits of its poor victims. So talking about the industry’s inefficiency may increase the number of its victims as well as the suffering of each victim.

Zoopolis, which was the topic of the last five posts, is the most familiar, and probably so far the most extensive and original attempt to suggest a theory of animal protection in the realm of political science. But it didn’t start the course, which some call ‘the political turn in animal ethics’. That is usually attributed to Robert Garner who wrote about the issue in mid-90’s.
In the following text we’ll address his book A Theory of Justice for Animals – Animal Rights in a Nonideal World from 2013, where he presents his theory for animal justice.

Garner starts formulating his theory of justice for animals by rejecting the two major objections to the claim that it is even relevant to apply principles of justice to animals:
“The first – that justice is inappropriate for animals because it is a distributive concept involving, typically, material goods – is quickly dispensed with on the grounds that the distributional paradigm can be extended to include primary goods which clearly apply to animals. The second objection is that animals, not being moral agents, are incapable of agreeing and upholding principles of justice. For this reason, animals are excluded as recipients of justice in most contractarian theories of justice, and, most notably, the theory of justice provided by Rawls.”
This objection is dispensed by the argument from marginal cases: “One difficulty for Rawls here (and for contractarianism in general) is that insisting upon moral agency as an entry qualification for justice also has the effect of excluding some humans, such as the very young and the severely mentally disabled, so called “marginal” humans.”
In other words, if principles of justice don’t apply to beings who are not moral agents, then they shouldn’t apply to many humans as well, a conclusion humans find unacceptable. But to remain consistent, they must either accept the exclusion of some humans from principles of justice, or the inclusion of nonhuman animals. Obviously Garner is in the later camp.

The reason Garner insists on a theory of justice rather than sticking to the moral realm is that according to him, morality independent of justice is equivalent, in theory, to the voluntary character of charity. “The requirement to be just to animals means, in practice, that it is regarded as a pressing matter, one that should be considered compulsory and not left to individuals to decide if they want to abide by obligations. Moreover, it is incumbent on the state, above all, to ensure that animals are treated justly. Insofar as there are direct duties owed to animals within a moral realm independent of justice, they cannot be based on the principles of charity or compassion, since the decision to act so as to benefit animals according to these principles is entirely voluntary. No duties, in other words, are invoked.”

We agree that moral issues must be regarded as a pressing matter, one that should be considered compulsory and not left to individuals to decide if they want to abide by obligations, but taking this matter to the state level would practically mean that individual humans would feel that it is not their responsibility. On the face of it, had people been moral, compassionate and caring, then first of all, moral obligations to animals would indeed be regarded as a pressing matter (as opposed to the current indifference), and second, if the state they live in doesn’t see it that way, humans should replace their representatives to ones who do.
Obviously this claim is extremely naïve, but mostly because it replies to an even more naïve claim that “it is incumbent on the state, above all, to ensure that animals are treated justly” in a world where there has not even been one single state ever in history that ensured that humans, their own citizens, are treated justly.

Garner argues that we need to frame the obligations humans have to nonhuman animals in the language of justice, because justice entails legal compulsion. But humans have framed their obligations to other humans in the language of justice long ago, yet it didn’t entail legal compulsion in any state. We live in an extremely unjust world, a world where injustice to humans occurs every single minute, in every single state, so we fail to see why and how would the change of language of the obligations to animals succeed where it colossally failed when it comes to humans, despite that humans, generally speaking, do care about other humans.

Besides the issue of unprecedentedness (or failed precedent of justice, anywhere at any time along human history and for humans only), the very idea of reliance and emphasis on the state and on the legal system to bring justice is in itself unjust. That is because states, laws and rights are power based, discriminatory in their nature, and virtually are “the law of the strongest” in a civilized clothing, and as long as the political and legal system is human, it is bound to be unjust and speciesist.
Clearly, the very situation of humans representing animals’ interests, according to rules that humans and humans alone have shaped, is in itself utterly unjust. There can never be equality when one group decides everything for all the other groups. Inequality is inherent to an interspecies system where only one species makes all the rules.

Garner’s Sentience Position

After explaining why a theory of justice and not a moral one is what’s needed, Garner tries to strengthen his case by mentioning some disadvantages of specific moral theories commonly used to protect animals.
Regarding care ethics he claims that when separated from principles of justice, it is likely to lead to an illegitimate prioritization of humans’ particular relationships with other animals.
Regarding virtues ethics he claims that some prior ethical theory is needed to identify virtues and vices in the first place. In his words: “Without any prior moral standards, we could neither identify moral virtues nor determine their content.” He also mentions that virtue ethics, like care ethics, does not always provide a clear guide to action or moral judgment. And also that it is vulnerable to conflicts between virtues.
Regarding relational ethics he claims that it would have the implication that we owe no obligations – positive or negative – to those with whom we do not have a relationship. He quotes DeGrazia’s remarks on the matter: “giving extensive weight to social bonds might destabilize the moral status of many humans; unloved loners, people from very different cultures or highly isolated countries.” And of course, when it comes to nonhuman animals, it follows that animals with whom humans don’t have a relationship, have no moral worth at all.
Regarding utilitarianism he makes the famous claim that it neglects the individual. “Its aggregative character results in allowing “some people to be treated as less than equals, as a means to other people’s ends” (Rowlands, 2009: 42). In other words, the way that humans and animals are treated in utilitarianism is not a product of the characteristics they possess as individuals, “but of the effects of their treatment on others”.”
Regarding what he calls the species-egalitarian version of animal rights, he claims that it is “failing to take into account the importance of nonpersonhood interests, it fails to take into account the moral significance of those interests associated with persons. In other words, the species-egalitarian strand of animal rights is flawed because it is difficult to argue against the claim that the differences between “normal” adult humans and adult animals are substantial and are morally significant. In short, the level of complexity of an individual affects what can be a harm for it.
In particular, the fact that most animals lack the characteristics of personhood challenges the claim that they have equivalent levels of interest in life and liberty to “normal” humans. In other words, it is not possible to justify moral egalitarianism between humans and animals because it is not the case that humans and animals have equally important interests in life and liberty.”
Another reason Garner rejects the rights-based species egalitarianism as a possible candidate for a theory of justice for animals is that it does not qualify as a realistic utopia (as it is unrealistic).

Hence, Garner suggests his own theory – The Sentience Position.
“As its name suggests, it is based on the assumption that at least some nonhuman animals have an interest in not suffering. As a result, they have a prima facie interest in avoiding suffering that might be inflicted on them by humans. If we are prepared to say that humans have a right not to suffer at the hands of others, then, given that animals have a similar, although by no means identical, capacity to suffer, consistency demands that we also accord a right not to suffer to animals. If this is granted, and we do not try to identify additional interests animals possess to which we might attach a right, then this is a position claiming that what is wrong with our treatment of animals is not their use per se but is a product of what we do to them whilst they are being used.”

Garner’s theory of justice for animals is rights-based but as aforementioned non-egalitarian. That means that according to him: “… the opportunities account of the wrongness of killing suggests that humans have more to lose by death. As a result, it would be justified morally to choose the life of a human over an animal on the grounds that this would cause less harm“.
However, obviously that is not true. Given that humans are causing much more harm than any other animal, it would be utterly unjustified morally to choose the life of a human over another animal on the grounds that this would cause less harm.

Garner, like most others, considers only one part of the equation, the tiniest, and in our view the least important, ethically speaking, which is the effect on the agent, while totally ignoring the effects of the agent. This consideration is particularly partial and superficial when the case is of humans vs. nonhumans. Every being has a price tag, but humans’ is nonproportional to any other being.

Garner’s perspective stems from the ethical line of thought that the question in the center of morality is how to live a good life and not how to live while being good to others. When the question in the center of morality is of how one must live and not how one must treat others, then the focus in cases of conflict of interests is who can potentially live a better life, and not who can potentially cause less harm to others. When affecting others is in the center of ethical questions then the conclusion is totally different. Human life is not at all more important under this approach.

Life has no point or meaning whatsoever in cosmic terms, and nothing has any external justification in terms of purpose. No one and nothing is more important than anything or anyone else in cosmic or purposefulness terms. Everything and everyone exist for no reason or purpose, so there is no reason to prioritize humans for allegedly having superior capabilities since these, even if for the sake of the argument we’ll accept that exist, have no meaning or purpose in cosmic terms. It is not important that they would exist. Only experiences are morally relevant.
If there is no purpose to existence and everyone exists for no reason, then what we must focus on is how to make everyone’s existence as tolerable as possible by minimizing negative experiences. Since humans are nonproportionally causing most of the negative experiences in the world, actually they are supposed to be at the bottom of the hierarchy of moral consideration, not indisputably placed at the top. When causing suffering to others, and not the ability to experience other mental capacities by the self, is in the center, human life is not more important but less.
Humans increase suffering in the world, they increase the number of suffering beings in the world, they increase the individual suffering of individual beings in the world. However you frame it, clearly, human life is the worst.
We think it is at least a very substantial justification against human protection, most certainly against an equal protection.

Garner’s Speciesist Position

According to Garner the species egalitarian version of animal rights fails as an ethical theory not only because humans and animals differ in ways that are morally relevant such as that normal adult humans possess a greater interest in life and liberty than most animals and that this ought to be reflected in the calculation of the respective moral importance of humans and animals, but also because it does not pass the realistic utopia test. “That is, the species-egalitarian version of animal rights, irrespective of whether it is a valid ethical position, requires too much of human beings, necessitating a transformation of what would seem to be our natural tendency to put our species, at least in some instances, first morally. That is, it fails to take into account the shared heritage of humanity that, from time immemorial, has used animals. In the language of communitarianism, it fails to take into account the history of narrative life stories.”
And he quotes Alasdair MacIntyre to strengthen his point: “I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.” And adds himself: “Animals have certainly played a part in these narrative life stories, but they have never been the moral equal of humans.”
But we think it doesn’t strengthen his point. The fact that humans are biased to be speciesist doesn’t justify a speciesist theory. All along history, white straight men prioritized their own group first, but no one thinks white supremacy is therefore morally justified. We fail to understand how this argument is not, in the least bad case, a naturalistic fallacy and in the worst case utterly speciesist.

However, as rationally and morally indefensible as this claim may be, it is also practically inevitable. Humans indeed inherit from their past, their family, their tribe, their nation, a variety of inheritances that constitute the given of their life, and their moral starting point.
For that, among other reasons, it is hard to disagree that indeed the species-egalitarian version of animal rights requires too much of human beings. Not in the sense that there is something wrong with demanding humans species-egalitarianism, but in a sense of humans being way too inherently speciesist for such a demand to ever be implemented.

Having said that, that doesn’t mean that we should focus on a nonideal theory for animal justice, as Garner urges us to do, assisted by another political philosopher called Jonathan Wolff whom he quotes: “the task for the political philosopher is not to design the best possible world, but to design the best possible world starting from here.”
Designing the best possible world starting from here, is hardly likely to serve any justice for billions of animals for whom ‘here’ is the aggregated history of exploitation and suffering. It is hardly unlikely that the victims would suffice with such a task, which is more likely to serve the victimizers. It is more likely that victims would seek for an ideal theory and wouldn’t understand why must they compromise, at their own expense, on what the victimizers, and the victimizers alone, view as the best possible world, all the more so when the victimization is as old as the victimizers are, and is unproportionate to any other case of victimization ever in history.

From here, can only be different levels of nonideal lives for the victims. From here, can only be compromises at the expense of the victims, without hearing their say. From here, can only be discussions between humans over how many nonhumans humans are willing to sacrifice.

Garner’s conceptualization is speciesist, since he turns the whole issue to be about some humans advocating for an ideal theory of justice for animals, and others advocating for a nonideal one. In his terms it is about what humans are willing to do instead of about what nonhumans need and are likely to be willing to accept. And we find it hard to believe that they would be willing to compromise on his nonideal theory. In fact, we find it hard to believe that they would be willing to even consider it as nonideal, a term only humans can use, since for the victims, no theory is ideal, certainly not one that permits using them for humans’ purposes, or that doesn’t even pretend to provide an egalitarian state of affairs, and starts looking at things ‘from here’ – an extremely speciesist world in which they are systematically exploited by humans.

No theory is ideal, even the ones who advocate for a vegan world, and that is because it is always humans who are setting the standards, it is always humans who are determining which suffering is necessary despite that it is highly doubtful that anyone but humans would accept any of it as necessary, not to mention as just. Clearly this is always the case, under all theories. It is inherent to the world, but it is still fucked up and that’s why this world is so inherently fucked up.
This claim is not a theoretical stubborn insistency on an ideal theory, there are real victims, numerous of them, behind these cruel compromises. Behind each harm that humans determine as necessary, there are billions of victims, and to none of which was it necessary. Arguing that there is nothing to do about the suffering of billions of nonhuman animals in the plant based agriculture due to humans’ need to eat, is kind of might is right. Clearly, for the victims of human civilization, in the plant based food industry, in the clothing industry, due to human construction, transportation, leisure, entertainment and etc., nothing is necessary.
Was it up to them, the standard was much much higher than a vegan world with no experiments and no use of animals in the clothing and entertainment industries. Most probably, they would at least demand that humans would live just as any other species in terms of population size, living space, resources use, and effect on other species and their environment.
In other words, only if and when humans live like any other species, would it be relevant to discuss egalitarianism and necessary suffering.

There is nothing necessary about anything that humans are doing. It is necessary that a human would feed oneself as long as s/he lives, but humans can feed themselves with what other apes are feeding themselves, meaning whatever is growing in their restricted living area. It is not necessary that they would feed themselves by driving to a supermarket, and consume products consisted of double digits ingredients with each being transported from a different part of the world, each being grown in a different farm, each being sprayed with several chemicals, being processed several times, wrapped with several packages, some of which made out of nonbiodegradable materials that would affect sentient beings for hundreds of years ahead. None of this is necessary by a non-speciesist measure.

The inequality is inherent because it is impossible to live without hurting other sentient beings. That is the case even when living in small numbers, in a small territory, with a small footprint. And it is certainly the case when it comes to humans who each of them, including vegans, has a tremendous footprint, nonproportional to any other being from any other species.

Injustice to animals is everywhere and in everything. Every aspect of humans’ lives is bound with injustice to nonhumans. Not just factory farming but any type of farming is unjust. The levels of discrimination obviously largely differ, but excluding nonhumans from a particular area, tearing out the native vegetation and planting ones that suit humans’ desires and not necessarily the needs of the native residents of the region, fencing the area, constantly poisoning nonhumans in it, changing the composition of the soil, dividing the nearby lands with roads to the farms, plundering water from other habitats, making noises with heavy machinery, crushing nonhumans with heavy machinery, polluting the area with humans’ waste of many kinds and etc. are all unquestionably forms of an unjust discrimination.

Therefore even what Garner considers as an ideal theory of justice is super anthropocentric. And such an anthropocentric approach can be considered ideal, so ideal that according to Garner it is utopic, only because the world is so speciesist.

The idea that since humans are not gods on the face of the earth but just another species, they must live as such, and anything beyond that can’t be justified morally and actually is a violation of distributive justice, doesn’t even get any mentioning, not even among the utopian unrealistic ideal theories. And that is while in fact, such a theory should be considered as a nonideal one, which some activists may argue that we need to compromise on, because an ideal theory is one which suggests no suffering at all. So the disputation is supposed to be between the ideal theory which is of a world where no human ever causes any suffering to anyone, and a nonideal theory which is of a world where humans keep causing suffering to some animals but only as part of them being just another animal in an inherently violent world of limited resources, not because they are still controlling each and every inch of it.
Practically, both theories are not even mentioned. Not only in Garner’s book, or in others’ books, but almost never, by anyone.

The issue is supposed to be about the victims, not about some of the opinions of some of the victimizers. If we can’t provide a theory that suggests a state of affairs that suffice the victims then the theory is not morally justified. And indeed we can’t. That’s one of the main reasons we exist as a movement. There is no and there could be no ideal theory of justice since the inequity is inherent, and not only to the political and social sphere of the matter, but to the very essence of life. It is impossible to exist not at the expense of other sentient beings, and so it is impossible for a truly ideal theory of justice to ever come up, not to mention to ever be implemented.

There is no valid ethical theory in this world. Morally, humans mustn’t violate the rights of others, but practically they can’t avoid it. For humans to exist, others must suffer. But humans are not morally entitled to compromise on others’ lives. They just do.
A world in which humans are inherently bound to do what they morally mustn’t, is a world that they shouldn’t exist in.

The following post is the fifth and last part in a series of posts dedicated to the book Zoopolis. If you haven’t read the previous ones, it is recommended that you do so before reading the following text, especially if you haven’t read the book Zoopolis itself.
In this part we’ll focus on the third Zoopolis’ citizenship category ­– Denizenship for what they refer to as “liminal” animals.

But first, who are they referring to when they talk about “liminal” animals?
“This domestic/wild dichotomy ignores the vast numbers of wild animals who live amongst us, even in the heart of the city: squirrels, raccoons, rats, starlings, sparrows, gulls, peregrine falcons, and mice, just to name a few. If we add in suburban animals, such as deer, coyotes, foxes, skunks, and countless others, it becomes clear that we are not dealing with a few anomalous species here, but rather a large variety of non-domesticated species who have adapted to life amongst humans. Wild animals live, and always have lived, amongst us. We will call this group liminal animals, to indicate their in-between status, neither wilderness animals nor domesticated animals. Sometimes they live amongst us because humans have encroached on or encircled their traditional habitat, leaving them no choice but to adapt as best they can to human settlement. But in other cases, wild animals actively seek out areas of human settlement, which may offer greater food sources, shelter, and protection from predators as compared with traditional wilderness habitat.”
Or In other words: “Liminal animals are those who have adapted to life amongst humans, without being under the direct care of humans.”

And they add that:
“liminal animals come into view only when their numbers or behavior turn them into ‘pests’. In other words, they are visible when they become a problem, but invisible as ubiquitous members of the community. We have paid remarkably little attention to the diversity of these animals, the kinds of spaces they inhabit, and the ways we interact with them-from the mice who inhabit our houses, to the sparrows and feral pigeons who scavenge in city cores, to the deer and coyotes who thrive in the suburbs, to the countless species who have evolved in symbiosis with traditional agricultural practices (e.g., the birds, rodents, and small mammals who feed on agricultural crops, and the larger mammals and raptors who prey on them in turn).”

We find it a little bit surprising that a political model for the relations of humans and nonhumans focused much more on domesticated and “wild” animal than on liminal animals, as at least our intuition was that it would be the other way around, given that many activists think that there shouldn’t be domesticated animals and that “wild” animals should be left alone, and so, if anything, the ones which truly need a special political attention are animals who are neither of which, animals that allegedly aren’t directly exploited by humans, or allegedly live independently and with no direct contact with humans.
Obviously this is not really the case but that is how it is generally viewed by the animal rights theory, so we thought liminal animals would get most of the attention in the book. However, it seems that liminal animals get less attention, not only in the book but also in its reviews and critiques. Having said that, it is to their credit that they have at least addressed this neglected issue. They deeply comprehend that there always have been, and always will be, animals who adapt to live near humans, and/or would be drawn to the opportunities offered by humans’ waste disposal, agricultural, and resource management practices, and that humans can’t keep ignoring that. What they don’t deeply comprehend is that denizenship, or any other political option can never solve that problem.

From Pests to Denizens?

According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, the just political model for this group of animals can’t be sovereignty like in the case of “wild” animals since their habitat is human cities, backyards and houses. And it can’t be citizenship like in the case of domesticated animals since that presupposes a level of sociability and interaction with humans that most liminal animals are unable of, or is undesirable for them.
Therefore what they do suggest is:
“We argue that the best way to conceptualize this relationship is in terms of denizenship. Liminal animals are co-residents of human communities but not co-citizens. They belong here amongst us, but are not one of us. Denizenship captures this distinctive status, which is fundamentally different from either co-citizenship or external sovereignty. Like citizenship, denizenship is a relationship that should be governed by norms of justice, but it is a looser sort of relationship, less intimate or cooperative, and therefore characterized by a reduced set of rights and responsibilities”

They are aware of the problematics regarding this group of animals:
“One problem, already noted, is that these animals are invisible in our everyday worldview. Given the way we draw a dichotomy between nature and human civilization, urban space is defined precisely in opposition to what is wild and natural. We therefore do not see liminal animals, at least when thinking and talking about how to design and govern our societies. For example, urban design rarely, if ever, gives any consideration to the impact of human decisions on liminal animals, and urban planners are rarely trained to consider these issues. As a result, liminal animals are often the victims of inadvertent harms from our buildings, roads, wires, fences, pollution, rogue pets, and so on. Qua species, liminal animals may have adapted to these dangers of life with humans, but many individuals die gruesome and unnecessary deaths.”

They are also aware of the problematics regarding their suggested solution, yet still propose it:
“Denizenship can quickly become a source of exploitation and oppression if the rights and responsibilities are defined in such a way as to consign denizens to the status of a permanently subordinated caste group. But where the rights and responsibilities are reduced in a more reciprocal way, and done in order better to accommodate the distinctive interests of denizens themselves, then denizenship can serve as a vehicle for just relationships.”

The chances for animals who are currently mostly considered by humans as “pests” – a status which has nothing to do with the animals’ qualities but is mostly depended upon their quantities, as the more there are of them the more likely it is they are regarded as pests – to be considered as denizens are extremely small.
And regarding urban design, the chances that humans would start to plan their cities with any consideration to the impact on liminal animals, are also extremely small, that is especially so when more and more urban areas show less and less consideration for the common human. When even humans are barely considered when cities are planned, growing, and being renovated, when more and more cities are becoming spaces for rich people, private cars, corporations and shopping malls instead of for pedestrians, bicycles, public transportation, small enterprises and etc. (there are some improvements in some cities in recent years but that is an improvement after a serious deterioration that shouldn’t have occurred in the first place, and it is very marginal), it is extremely unlikely that nonhumans would be taken under serious consideration.

The implications of these considerations are very far-reaching as animals live everywhere and are hurt by everything humans are doing.

Many animals who live in cities do not see its roadways as off-limits.
Millions upon millions of animals are run over on roadways in cities every year including squirrels, opossums, porcupines, boars, mice, and pigeons.
And the harm that roadways inflict on animals is not limited to direct hits. The loud noise, strong lights at night, pollution and fear are also very harmful.
The transportation system is enough of an inherent feature of human society to condemn it as irrevocably harmful to “liminal” animals. But there are others.

Tree trimming is another urban example of harm to “liminal” animals. Humans trim or cut down trees every once in a while with no consideration to the trees’ inhabitants which are mostly birds but also mice, worms, beetles, ants, squirrels and etc. Trimming often results in exposing bird nests to predators or in the worst case in cutting off the branches that hold the nest.

It is not very likely that humans would be willing to forsake clean pavements, clean cars and of course clear view from their windows, for the sake of nonhumans.
And it is even much less likely in cases of animals living, or even temporarily lodging, inside their houses.

During spring, female raccoons look for a safe place to give birth and nurture their babies. They find the warmth and comfort of humans’ houses to be a perfect substitute for a natural den.
Humans are very unwelcoming. Raccoons are considered as pests by humans because they fear they might destroy their house insulation, damage the roof while gaining access to the house, chew holes into soffits, rip apart ducts, because they leave their feces in large communal piles on roofs, decks, attics, woodpiles, and etc., because some humans falsely believe that raccoons are common carriers of rabies, and that they might attack their dog or cat.

And since Donaldson and Kymlicka are in favor of humans owning chickens, another concern relevant in a zoopolis world is that raccoons would manage to reach them and kill them.

Raccoons are smart, extremely adaptable, fast-growing in population, and are opportunistic eaters meaning their diet is determined by the environment they live in. Raccoons will eat almost anything they can find, their main target in cites is garbage, bird feeders, and unattended pet food. All that makes them very common in urban environments, and not very likely to leave gently.

Suggestions such as installing a motion-activated bright light or a loud alarm, taking advantage of raccoons’ sensitive eyes and hearing, are harmful. And other, less harmful measures are practically irrelevant. There is no reason to believe that humans, who despite that most of them view raccoons as pests, don’t make sure that their trash cans are locked, their attic is keyed, the vents are sealed, that there are no loose shingles and that if there are ones they immediately repair them, that there is no way to get in through the chimney, or dwell in wall voids or under the decks, or whatever, that don’t regularly clean the yard of any piles of debris or leaves since it can serve as perfect hiding spots and dwellings for raccoons, and don’t keep all food indoors all the time, will decide to take responsibility since if raccoons would get into to their house they would have to be forcefully removed.

And of course raccoons are just an example of a “liminal” animal. Other species such as Coyotes, Sparrows, Bobcats, Boars, Ref Foxes, Baboons (very common in Cape Town for example), Rhesus (very common in India for example), Martens (very common in central Europe), Squirrels, and of course Mice and Rats, are also very common in cities. Humans may have different issues with each species but the principle is the same. And humans will not compromise their comfort, let alone in their own houses, for the sake of nonhumans.

And it is not very likely that humans would compromise their comfort outside their houses either, for example in public spaces.
According to the World Health Organization after air pollution, noise is the largest environmental cause of health problems. Besides obvious impacts such hearing impairment and sleep disorder, excessive noise can also cause mood swings, insomnia, depression, and stress related illnesses. In 2018, the American College of Cardiology linked noise pollution to a range of cardiovascular problems, such as high blood pressure, heart attacks, stroke and coronary heart disease. Animals living in cities are harmed by noise just as much.
Studies have long ago linked excessive noise to poor health among human city dwellers. But only very recently a comprehensive study regarding the impact of noise on animals has been published. The meta-study, which was conducted by scientists at Queen’s University Belfast, and published in the scientific journal Biology Letters, covered 108 studies of 109 species, which were divided into seven groups: amphibians, arthropods, birds, mammals, fish, reptiles and molluscs. The researchers looked at studies that measured changes in species’ behavior, or other traits such as hormone levels before and after exposure to noise. Then, they took all the calculations and put them together. It appears that all seven groups were impacted by anthropogenic noise.
Birds, frogs and insects that rely on sound for communication are particularly harmed by noise pollution. If birds can’t hear because of the noise of the traffic, they fail to hear their chicks crying for food, or other birds’ warning of a predator.
The researchers suggest that noise pollution affecting animals is the norm, not the exception.

Noise pollution, along with light pollution, which is another major harm for animals living in cites, disrupt many animals normal sleep–wake cycle, which causes many of them various behavioral and health issues. In addition, both pollutions, decrease animals’ sleeping duration and as a consequence decrease their immune system strength.

A different study (The association between telomere length and cancer risk in population studies from 2016) found that nestlings of House Sparrow who were reared under traffic noise had reduced telomere length when compared with their unexposed neighbors, an effect that could be mediated by oxidative stress. Shorter telomeres have been linked to increased vulnerability of several types of cancer. In addition, noise exposure increased stress hormone levels and suppressed cellular immunity in tree frogs according to a study called Effects of traffic noise on tree frog stress levels, immunity and color signaling from 2017, and both of these effects are generally considered to be cancer risk factors.

Noise pollution is not the only reason Cancer is found in more and more animals who live in cities.
Urban environment, which is one of the leading causes of Cancer among humans, also effects cancer rates among nonhumans. Animals that are in contact with humans live in a disturbed, resource-rich environment, with an increased exposure to chemical pollution, artificial light at night, novel food sources including processed foods and sugar-rich foods, and changes in infection patterns, all are environmental factors that favor carcinogenesis.

“Liminal” animals live near humans because of the high food quantities, however the food quality is low.
Inappropriate nutrition (high levels of processed fat, low levels of protein, vitamins, antioxidants and other essential nutrients) can lead to depletion of fat reserves, poor body condition and decrease in innate and acquired immune responses in animals. According to the studies: Nutritional physiology and ecology of wildlife in a changing world from 2017, and Linking anthropogenic resources to wildlife-pathogen dynamics from 2015,  at the global level, animals in regions with the highest human densities and per capita food losses are most affected by those anthropogenic factors.

Pollutants are known to cause cancer in humans, and evidences that similar pathways are also affecting the health of animals have been accumulating. Familiar examples include the effects of water pollution with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), polychlorinated byphenyl and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethanes on cancer cases among fishes (according to the study Dermal melanoma with schwannoma-like differentiation in a brown bullhead catfish), as well as mammals (according to the studies: The role of organochlorines in cancer-associated mortality in California sea lions from 2005 and Sentinel California sea lions provide insight into legacy organochlorine exposure trends and their association with cancer and infectious disease from 2015). However, most of the numerous pollutants found in urban environments are unexplored in relation to nonhumans, so the prevalence of Cancer is probably much higher. For example, the mixture of pollutants found in the air of cities, which predominantly come from local vehicular traffic in urban areas, and includes emission of gases, particles, volatile organic compounds and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, many of which are considered as carcinogens, were not examined in relation to nonhumans. An increased risk of lung cancer associated with exposure to outdoor air pollutants has been consistently found in several studies on humans, and it would have probably found the same result if examined among nonhumans.
The few studies that have been done on other agents present in air pollution such as benzene, kerosene, toluene and xylenes, have found them to be associated with mammary carcinomas in rodents.
And another study has found an association of traffic-related air pollution with an increase in the incidence of lung adenoma and tumour multiplicity of urethane-induced adenomas among mice.

In humans, the link between artificial light at night (ALAN) and cancer was first established in female employees working rotating night shifts (Missing the dark: health effects of light pollution from 2009) and was recently also confirmed in the context of urbanization (Light and the city: breast cancer risk factors differ between urban and rural women, from 2017). The increased breast cancer risk in female night shift workers has been postulated to result from the suppression of pineal melatonin production. Melatonin, a hormone present in all vertebrates and also in bacteria, protozoa, plants, fungi and invertebrates, is involved in the regulation of circadian rhythms; it peaks at night and is suppressed by light. Direct links between artificial light at night, melatonin and cancer prevalence have not been established for animals so far, however, there are several studies showing changes in the levels of hormones that have been related to cancer in humans.

Another example of a major urban harm is skyscrapers.
Up to one billion birds die in glass collisions every year in the US alone. Many of which are “wild” birds but many others are what they refer to as “liminal” animals.
Some birds collide with buildings since they are attracted to or distracted by the buildings’ bright lights at night. Even if the dazed birds don’t die from the violent collisions, some circle the illuminated buildings and eventually die of exhaustion.
Other birds collide with buildings during daytime as they get confused by the buildings’ clear, reflective glass.

In a way, skyscrapers are to birds, what cars are for numerous land animals – ­assassin tools.

Humanity must turn off the lights at night, and change all the clear windows into dimmer ones. Both are extremely unlikely to ever happen. The corporate world wants the glass to look shiny and mirrored because that is a symbol of productivity and prosperity. And as usual with humans, nonhumans pay the price for their careless and violent desires and preferences. Nonhumans pay the price for humans’ taste, in food, in cloths, entertainment, and even architecture.

The main reason so many animals are living near humans is food availability.
Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that humans would try to minimize food availability in order to prevent conflicts , however, food management can’t solve the problem because many animals are not coming to cities just for the food but in many cases for the weather.
Cities are known for their urban heat island effect, a phenomenon that in some cases can turn city centers as much as 22 degrees Fahrenheit hotter than areas surrounding them. Concrete and asphalt surfaces absorb rather than reflect sunlight during the day, storing it as heat, and release that heat at night. In addition, industries, vehicles and air conditioners are pumping out more heat, while buildings block out cooling winds. The heat island effect makes cites attractive for many animals in cold areas.
Humans are not likely to ever take that under consideration and currently even when it comes to food management the trend is the exact opposite. Piles of agricultural waste are left behind right after the harvest since only a small part of the harvested plant is used.
And of the food that actually leaves the farms’ gates about 30% is lost either by spoilage or wasteful processing. Studies regarding high-income countries estimate that the amount of loss can reach 50%.
And on the consumer level, the amounts of household waste consecutively grow every year. Each person in the US is responsible for 2Kg of garbage a day – twice the amount that was made four decades ago. The western European produces about 1.3kg per day.
About two thirds of the household waste is food waste.

This world is humans’ world in every possible aspect. Human footprint is all over this planet. Everyone is hurt by them somehow. The problem with humans is everything.

https://youtu.be/afOndVLay5I

Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest some measures to avoid some of the conflicts:
“human communities may erect barriers and create disincentives in order to limit the population of incoming liminal animals. For example, we can dramatically increase monitoring of international travel and shipping to prevent stowaways. We can use physical barriers to discourage in-migration from wild areas that brush up against highly populated human centres. We can reduce incentives that attract migrating animals to human communities. (For example, we can stop creating expansive lawns of Kentucky blue grass next to ponds-a microenvironment which is irresistible to the Canada goose.) Or we can use active disincentives (e.g., noise blasters, off-leash dog parks) to discourage liminal migrants from landing or settling.”

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, none of their options is to drastically decrease the human population so there would be as little clashes as possible. A dramatic decrease in human population can also assist with other crucial measures such as a much better waste management, a much better sewage management, locked trash cans, sealed roofs, covered porches and etc.
There are already many good reasons to do all of the above, and much more, for humans own sake, yet they choose not to, so they are definitely not going to do it for nonhumans sake.

What they are willing to do is use active disincentives such as noise blaster to discourage “liminal” migrants from landing or settling – a terrible option which shouldn’t have been suggested by Donaldson and Kymlicka in the first place. Most of the “liminal” animals didn’t invade territories in which humans have lived, but the other way around, or that they were pushed into them by human habitat destruction and so had no other options. Their “choice” of being “liminal” is largely a result of human occupation of the planet. So suggesting such an option is not only legitimizing human occupation, but also blasting nonhumans with noise when they are coming to claim their share.

There is no such thing as “no man’s land” (in itself an outstandingly speciesist term), animals live and lived everywhere. Humans’ “sovereignties” are simply occupied territories.

Even if humanity would decide to seriously consider the harms to “liminal” animals, something which is extremely unlikely as currently most of them are considered by most of humanity as “pests”, many problems are unavoidable. And that is especially the case if we don’t focus on nonhumans who live inside human communities only, but also on nonhumans who live near and off human communities. Most of the “liminal” animals are harmed by human activists which are not necessarily within their communities but as a result of them. Or put more simply, most “liminal” animals are harmed by agriculture, an activity which humans can’t do without, and so it is an unsolvable harm.

Agriculture – The Greatest Harm to “Liminal” Animals

“We should not recklessly put ourselves in situations where we are likely to face lethal conflicts with animals, and we should make reasonable efforts to identify practices that would allow us to reduce existing conflicts, in order that, to the extent possible, we can respect the inviolable rights of animals.”
That means no industrial development and more importantly no more agriculture as both are undoubtedly situations where humans are not likely to face lethal conflicts, but are utterly lethal conflicts.

As hard as it is for us, as vegans ourselves, to say and for some activists to accept, plant based agriculture is far from being a cruelty free option. In fact veganism is actively encouraging one of the largest systems of human domination worldwide, which systematically hurts billions of sentient beings. Eating a vegan meal is participating in a long and complex web of intensive food production.

Animals who live in or near agriculture lands (exactly because they are there), are considered as “liminal” animals, and numerous of them are harmed by various agriculture practices.
The first stages of agricultural cultivation are tillage and plowing, which means in simple words, intentionally breaking the soil and turning it over. Tillage practices can carve up as deep as a meter and a half (5 feet) into the ground in order to bring deeper soil layers to the surface. This invasive procedure is accomplished with massive machinery as moldboard, disks or chisel plow (also called rippers) which destroy everything and everyone who is “in the way”. In fact one of the formal functions of tillage is to destroy nests, dens and burrows, home to countless sentient beings.

The purpose of the plowing process which is done repeatedly before planting or seeding, is to change the soil formation, to warm it, and to provide a seedbed. After the seeding, the soil will be plowed again a few more times, to prevent “weeds” from growing.

After the heavy machines tilled and plowed, other heavy machines go across the land planting seeds. The same seeds, over and over. Each time these heavy machines go over the land they might run animals over, or destroy their nests, dens and burrows.

The water waste of animal “agriculture” is notorious, but plant based agriculture also places a huge strain on water resources. Humans’ water plundering deprives nonhumans of food and cover as vegetation is also severely affected by the water scarcity.

Irrigation also worsens the pollution damage made by the agriculture chemicals (mostly fertilizers), by increasing the wash off to the surrounding area, where many nonhumans live.
Many chemicals are used during several agriculture stages, and all of them are harmful in one way or another. But the most familiar harmful chemicals are obviously pesticides.

Humans have been poisoning the world while feeding themselves, for about 4,500 years now.
Overall pesticide use has increased 50-fold since 1950 and now more than 2.5 million tons are used each year. Several cycles of pesticide sprays during one crop cycle is not uncommon, and sometimes the seeds are even sprayed before planting.

Today it is estimated that the agricultural chemical industry is producing about 50,000 different commercial products based on approximately 900 active ingredients. All of which do what they are designed for and kill any plant that competes over resources, and any animal that attempts to make use of the land and plants that humans systematically rob from the other species.

And pesticides do much more than that. They have devastative effects on plants and animals all over the world, as some of them are easily carried by wind, rain and animals that consumed them and managed to get out of the poisoned area and unintentionally disperse them.
Rains wash some pesticides into ground and surface waters. A potent insecticide (poison which targets insects) named neonicotinoids was found in 17 out of 23 rivers in the UK, and in 74% of samples of water from the Great Lakes.
Some pesticides decompose slowly and remain in the environment for years, where they tend to bio-accumulate in the tissues of animals.

Another type of pesticides is herbicides, substances which are designed to kill species of plants not animals, however while killing plants that compete with the desired crop for light, water, nutrients, and space (and therefore are considered as pests), they are harming any animal which makes use of these plants. Herbicides dramatically change plants spread, some are critical for the local animals, and destroy the resources they depend upon, mostly habitat, food and cover from predators.

Organic agriculture, which is viewed by many as a magical solution, doesn’t avoid using potent chemicals as pesticides and herbicides which are still harmful to the ones they are intended to target, as well as many others. The difference is that, these compounds are “natural” and are considered unharmful to humans, as if it matters to the poisoned animals.

To avoid the use of chemical pesticides some farmers use “alternative” methods of “pest control” including “biocontrol” which is mostly predation and parasitism, and a huge range of traps from the common leg trap that snaps as someone treads upon it, to creative mechanisms that shoot sharp spears once triggered, scissor-like knifes that shuts firmly or a noose-like loop that tightens and chokes. Those inquisition devices are spread by the dozens on each hectare when “necessary”. In many cases the traps are covered and sometimes they contain baits. Usually they are placed right on top of burrows entrances or inside them, leaving no chance for the rodents who live there.

Burrows, which are the farmers’ main target, are also attacked by varied toxic gases, liquids called fumigants and also with foaming agents which are pumped into the burrow system, quickly filling it entirely. Smoke bombs are also used. All the burrow’s entrances are sealed shut making sure there is no way to escape suffocation and that the highly dangerous substances won’t be inhaled by humans. Even flammable gases such as propane are sometimes injected with a hose into the burrows and then ignited.
Flooding or burning fields have several “benefits”, among them is the fact that they serve as “pest control” methods.

Even if many of these methods are outlawed in a zoopolis world, does it make sense that it would be possible to produce sufficient amounts of food without any conflict of interests?
Obviously the population of nonhumans is a function of the available resources. Without any use of pesticides of any kind, if humans would allow all nonhumans to share all the crops they are raising, there would be none left for them. Agriculture can’t avoid conflict of interests.

Donaldson and Kymlicka write:
“What precisely this will require of us will vary considerably. For those of us who live in wealthy urban environments, the vast bulk of our daily interactions with animals clearly falls within the circumstances of justice. For those living in more remote areas alongside potentially aggressive wildlife, or in poorer societies without adequate infrastructure (e.g., waste disposal, impermeable housing barriers), the necessities of daily life may create more regular risks of lethal conflict, and greater measures would be needed to extend the circumstances of justice. In each case, there is a duty to sustain and extend the circumstances of justice, so as to respect as far as possible the inviolable rights of animals, but obviously more can be expected and demanded of those of us living in more propitious circumstances.”

None of us is really living in more “propitious circumstances” as all of us have to eat, and all food necessitates lethal conflicts. So everyone, including of course humans who live in urban environments, is depended upon less “propitious circumstances”.
In a world in which everyone lives at the expense of others it is impossible to respect the inviolable rights of animals. The idea of inviolable rights is basically oxymoronic. It can’t exist in a world based on violence, where beings constantly compete with each other over resources, not to mention that for many, other beings are the resources. Violence is a derivative of life’s most basic element – consuming energy. It is impossible for any being to live on this planet without hurting someone else and this ambition is particularly absurd when it comes to humans, whose massive and violent footprint is with no comparison to any other being, even those of vegans with a very high environmental awareness.

“Liminal” animals, like “wild” animals and most definitely domesticated animals, don’t need humans to frame them in a political model, they need humans to disappear.

The following post is the fourth part in a series of posts dedicated to Zoopolis. If you haven’t read the previous ones, it is recommended that you do so before reading the following text, especially if you haven’t read the book Zoopolis itself.
In this part we’ll focus on the second Zoopolis’ citizenship category ­– sovereign communities for “wild” animals.

A Better Protection From Humans

Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that as opposed to domesticated animals who should be considered as full citizens of human communities due to their dependency, “wild” animals should be seen as citizens of their own sovereign communities, whose relations to sovereign human communities would be regulated by norms of international justice. That according to them, would insure “wild” animals protection from various harms humans impose on them, harms which they divide into 3 broad categories: Continue reading →

The following post is the third part in a series of posts dedicated to Zoopolis. If you haven’t read the previous ones yet, it is recommended that you do so before the following text, especially if you haven’t read the book Zoopolis itself.

In this part we’ll focus on the first Zoopolis’ citizenship category ­– full citizenship for domesticated animals.

When it comes to domesticated animals Donaldson and Kymlicka approach rests on two main ideas:

“(1) domesticated animals must be seen as members of our community. Having brought such animals into our society, and deprived them of other possible forms of existence (at least for the foreseeable future), we have a duty to include them in our social and political arrangements on fair terms. As such, they have rights of membership-rights that go beyond the universal rights owed to all animals, and which are hence relational and differentiated;
(2) the appropriate conceptual framework for thinking about these relational membership rights is that of citizenship. Citizenship, in turn, has at least three core elements: residency (this is their home, they belong here), inclusion in the sovereign people (their interests count in determining the public good), and agency (they should be able to shape the rules of cooperation).”

But what would this model look like in practice? What would it mean to view domesticated animals through the lens of membership and citizenship? What forms of use of, or interaction with domesticated animal citizens would be permitted, and under what conditions?

Donaldson and Kymlicka detail what the idea of citizenship entails in nine areas:
1) Basic socialization
2) Mobility and the sharing of public space
3) Duties of protection
4) Use of animal products
5) Use of animal labor
6) Medical care
7) Sex and reproduction
8) Predation/Diet
9) Political representation

1) Basic Socialization

“…socialization is different from training for particular forms of labour (such as training dogs to be guide dogs for the blind). Socialization involves the basic and general skills/knowledge that individuals need to learn (insofar as possible) in order to be accepted into social community-like establishing control over bodily processes and impulses, learning basic communication, rules of social interaction, and respect for others. Training, on the other hand, is about developing a particular individual’s capacities and interests. Socialization is a basic threshold precondition for social membership.”

The idea that animals must go through social learning, and that socialization is a basic threshold precondition for social membership, is accepting and perpetuating the notion that this world is a human world. Obviously it would be humans who would conduct the social training, according to rules they would determine, and a threshold they would set.
Why should domesticated animals go through socialization which would further deepen their dependency on humans, instead of humans going a wildization? After all, all animals were wild before humans have domesticated so many of them, and so were humans. Doesn’t it make much more sense that if they are looking for just relations, historic justice, and to fix an historic crime of such unprecedented scale, that all animals, including humans, would go back to be wild? It is humans who forced this situation on everyone else so wouldn’t it be much more reasonable and fair of them to call to put things back to where they were before humans have conquered the entire planet and domesticated so many animals, than to perpetuate these animals’ dependency?
Why should animals who have been domesticated by humans go through another social and probably biological process conducted by humans to fix the original crime which is their domestication? If anything it is humans who must go back to be just another animal.

And what exactly is the fate of any individual who would “fail” to meet humans’ threshold? Would that individual be victimized the third time?! The first victimization is being forced to live with innate impairments and to be dependent on another species, all the more so the cruelest one ever to walk the face of the earth, the second victimization is being forced to go through a socialization process which doesn’t fit the nature of that individual and wasn’t chosen by that individual, and the third victimization is that if that individual “fails” to fit the humane conditions, s/he doesn’t receive social membership.

“Nevertheless, while the content of socialization is adaptable to individual and contextual factors, there are some general principles that should guide the process. The first, as noted, is that socialization should be conceived, not as the right of parents or states to mould individuals, but as the responsibility of parents or states to recognize individuals as members of the community, and to give them the skills and knowledge they need to thrive in that community, insofar as possible.
Second, socialization is not a lifelong process of control and intervention, but a temporary developmental process for bringing individuals into full membership of the community. It is justified, not as an end in itself, but because it facilitates the emergence of agency and the capacity to participate. By a certain point individuals have either internalized the basic norms, or they have not. Either way, the duty of others to mould them ends with childhood.
At a certain point respect requires that we accept that people are who they are-full citizens, warts and all. After that, individuals who violate basic norms may be humorously tolerated, shunned, or, if they become a danger to others, locked up. But it would be disrespectful to continue to treat them like children.”

Regarding the first point, it is pretty obvious that what would happen is a gradual neglect. To generally state that it is the “responsibility of parents or states to recognize individuals as members of the community, and to give them the skills and knowledge they need to thrive in that community, insofar as possible” is to state that it is no one’s responsibility. The responsibility must be much more specific, for example anyone who was involved in animal exploitation must be responsible in ensuring that the socialization process is implemented along with vets who worked in factory farms. That is just an example for a delegation of power which is specific instead of an empty statement. We are not at all in favor of such a move since obviously we are against the very idea of socialization, and even if it made sense, the last humans we would want to come near nonhumans are the ones who have exploited them in the most severe ways imaginable. Again, it is just an example for an option which is at least specific. Their general statement on the other hand is totally ambiguous. Who are the parents in this analogy?
It is quite clear that the people who would take responsibility for the matter would be volunteers who care enough about animals to do it in the most compassionate and sensitive way possible, therefore it would probably mean that there would always be a shortage of relevant people, or that it would be a governmental process, meaning it wouldn’t be conducted in the most compassionate and sensitive way possible, and that the process would probability simply be forsaken.

Regarding the second point, are they suggesting that animals’ behaviors must be subordinated to fit humans’ rules and criterions otherwise they would be punished or casted out? It is so ironic, especially since the pretense is to get justice for animals, but the more “animalistic” the animal, the less likely s/he is to fit the criterion. Punishing animals for being too true to their own nature is absurd!

Clearly this socialization process would end up being another kind of domestication because the ones who are found the most socialized would gain social membership and therefore would probably reach adulthood and be able to breed, and the less socialized wouldn’t, therefore this process would further domesticate already domesticated  animals. So the solution for domesticated animals is to domesticate them even more?

Donaldson and Kymlicka are aware of the potential harmfulness of this suggestion and argue that: “The fact that socialization of domesticated animals by humans is so often harsh and coercive is a comment, not on the capacities of animals, but on the ignorance, impatience, and disrespect of humans.”
The fact that this is how humans have behaved all along history is a very good reason, probably the main one for most activists, for why a total separation between humans and nonhumans is so desired. They want to keep humans away from nonhumans as far as possible and as soon as possible. It is not that they don’t want animals’ company or that they think that animals can’t be part of human society, as Donaldson and Kymlicka wrongly claim (and was addressed in the first post), it’s that they don’t wish animals with humans’ company, and that it is humans who can’t be part of animals’ society.

2) Mobility and the Sharing of Public Space

“To accept domesticated animals as members of our community means accepting that they belong here in the community, and have the prima facie right to share its public spaces. Acknowledging membership is inconsistent with confining individuals to private seclusion or to designated segregation zones.”
“But what sorts of regulations on freedom of movement and access are permissible within a citizenship model? How do we distinguish acceptable from unacceptable restrictions?”

Even the question itself is anthropocentrically framed and that is no surprise. What is surprising is the egalitarian pretense. Of course humans would determine the freedom of movement regulations and of course they and they alone would be the ones to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable restrictions of other animals’ movement.

Donaldson and Kymlicka draw much inspiration from the disability theory, but our world is still so highly inaccessible for humans with disabilities, so for nonhumans? all the more so ones that humans have so far extremely tortured before they ate them?!
And even if our world was much more accessible for humans with disabilities, the level of alteration required to make this world accessible for nonhumans is much more demanding. Will all highways be destroyed? Is humanity going to drastically diminish the high pollution level it produces? The high noise pollution it produces? The artificial light pollution it produces? Totally ban fireworks? Remove any hung down chain from any cow’s road? Any shiny object from any horse’s path? Would dogs be allowed to walk around freely? Would humanity adjust itself for early rising at the crack of dawn because of the millions of cock-a doodle-doos by the millions of chickens? And that is just a very partial list.

However, according to them recognizing domesticated animals as co-citizens doesn’t mean that restrictions cannot be justified:
“As in the case of humans, animals need sufficient mobility, not unlimited mobility. This need may be adequately met with large fenced ranges and pastures, and parks. And mobility restrictions are also justifiable on the grounds of protecting domesticated animals from predators, from highways, or from other dangers, and on the basis of protecting people from animals.”

And how is that not to confine animals or at least to severely restrict their movement? How is that not to restrict their population as obviously restrictions on their living areas are restrictions on their reproduction? How is it not to discriminate them when no such restrictions would be set upon humans? Would other resources be equally distributed between humans and nonhumans?
The human analogy is ridiculous. Their restrictions are meaningless compared with the ones suggested to be applied upon nonhumans even after they would gain citizenship.

3) Duties of Protection

“Recognizing domesticated animals as co-citizens has implications for our duties to protect them from harm, including harm from human beings, harm from other animals, and more generally harm from accidents or natural disasters.”
“Citizens are entitled to the full benefit and protection of the law, and this means that the duty of humans not to harm animals is not simply a moral or ethical responsibility, but ought to be a legal one. Harms to animals, like harms to humans, should be criminalized. This would include both the criminalization of deliberate harm, and also of negligence leading to harm or death.”

The question of course is what is harm? Does removing an animal from one’s backyard by screams and loud noises considered harm? Does using a non-kill trap to catch and release an animal considered harm? Does using repulsive smells to repel animals from one’s garden considered harm? How about directing a strong spotlight? All are considered harms in our book and if it is also the case in the book of Zoopolis then how exactly would humans deal with situations in which animals do things that humans rather they wouldn’t such as rabbits eating the plants in their garden, pigs digging in the garbage cans, goats using their house as a shelter during harsh weather, a cow standing in the middle of the road, a pack of dogs playing in the neighborhood playground, a cat who have decided that someone’s home is now his home too. What are they to do? How would humans protect nonhumans from humans?

“domesticated animal citizens need protection not only from humans, but also from other animals. We need to take steps to protect them from predators, disease, accidents, floods, or fires. In these cases, it is their status as members of our society, and not just their intrinsic moral status as sentient beings, that calls forth our duties of protection and rescue.”

How is that possible without harming “wild” animals? We’ll thoroughly deal with the issue of harms to “wild” animals in the next part, so here we will only shortly argue that the duty to protect domesticated animals from wild ones would probably involve violent measures and surly would frustrate “wild” animals and leave them hungry. Donaldson and Kymlicka criticize the common position among animal rights activists to let domesticated animal go extinct so the suffering from their innate problems and dependency would end, and to leave “wild” animals alone so they would not be harmed by humans, but they offer to perpetuate both problems. They suggest letting domesticated animals live despite all their innate problems and inevitable suffering, and that when “wild” animals would come to hunt them, humans are obligated to harm these animals in order to protect the animals that shouldn’t exist. “Wild” animals would keep getting hurt by humans and domesticated animals would keep existing despite their inevitable suffering, and despite the exploitation, which even if would end in the citizenship scenario, the potential for history to repeat itself would never cease.

4) Use of Animal Products

That point is probably the one that most activists would find to be the most outrageous.

Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that:
“Using others is legitimate if the terms of the relationship reflect and uphold the membership status of both parties, rather than permanently subordinating one to the other, and this, in turn, requires (as far as possible) respecting their agency and choices.”

One example they suggest is wool:
“Commercial wool operations harm sheep in many ways, subjecting animals to painful and frightening procedures in order to make wool gathering a profitable business (quite apart from the fact that the sheep eventually go to slaughter). But one can imagine ethical conditions under which humans can benefit from the use of sheep wool. Whereas wild sheep naturally shed their coats, domesticated sheep have been selectively bred to increase wool production, and many breeds have lost the ability to shed their coats. They need their wool to be shorn by humans once a year to protect them from disease and overheating.”

Using the wool of sheeps who have been selectively bred to increase their wool production and have lost the ability to shed their own coats by themselves sends a very speciesist message to humans. Instead of solving the problem of excessive wool and total dependency, they suggest that humans should keep using the deformity they have forced on millions upon millions of sheeps to their own benefit. Besides the perpetuation of speciesism, it is a foot in the door for the industrial wool industry’s comeback. If even in allegedly egalitarian societies in which animals are citizens of the community their genetic manipulation is perpetuated and keeps being used for humans’ gains, then this world is still a very human and exploitive world. These sheeps need help only as a result of the genetic manipulation humans have forced on them. Had humans not invaded their bodies they wouldn’t have grown more wool than they need, and would shed it when they need to, and by themselves. Using this wool is washing up the crime of the appalling selective breeding which is what enabled this use in the first place. Using this wool is not even a slippery slope, it is already exploiting the pendency situation derived from exploitation and manipulation which must be uprooted not perpetuated.

But according to them:
“Use is not necessarily exploitative, and indeed a refusal to use others effectively to prevent them from contributing to the general social good-can itself be a form of denying them full citizenship.”
“…refusing to consider that group as potential contributors to a common good is also a way of denying citizenship.”

Only that none of the sheeps have ever chosen the dire situation forced upon them and which is the grounds for their alleged ability to “contribute” to the common good.

Donaldson and Kymlicka are, oddly, trying to reverse the order of things arguing that not using wool is a form of discrimination similar to the one imposed on humans from certain ethnic origins who were banned from certain professions. Only that wool is not a profession and it wasn’t chosen by sheeps. Wool is part of sheeps’ bodies and it is available as a “common good” only due to genetic distortion. And sheeps are supposed to gain full citizenship not on the basis of their contribution to the common good, but since they need  protection from humans exploitation.
If Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that the ticket to full citizenship is contribution to the common good and sheeps’ contribution to the common good is the product of horrific selective breeding and exploitation, then this is an utter perpetuation of exploitation, as the logic is that since we have bred you to be totally depended and to grow too much wool, and since we have exploited you from time immemorial, then in order to fix this we’ll change the exploitation terms and call it work or contribution to the common good. Humans have been exploiting sheeps for thousands of years to the point that these animals have become depended and distorted beings. Now that this is the dire reality of sheeps the suggestion is to keep using them that way but to regulate it differently? That is shockingly anthropocentric and speciesist.

“The mode of contribution will vary greatly. Some may contribute simply by participating in loving and trusting relationships, others might contribute in more material ways. What is important is that all be enabled to contribute in a way suited to them.”
Surly living with excessive wool isn’t the suited way sheeps want to live. It probably suits them to live with the exact amount of wool they need and without being depended on humans to shed it. This claim is anthropocentric since this contribution is suited for humans only, and it is not chosen by the sheeps, maybe they too would like to contribute simply by participating in loving and trusting relationships.

Furthermore, there is no way to shear sheeps in a pleasant way. It can surly be much less violent and aggressive than the way it is currently being done by the industry, but it would always be submissively and never willingly and with consent. Humans are not likely to wait for sheeps to come to be sheared only when they wish to and on their own time. Even under the citizenship model they would be grabbed by humans who would move a cold sharp instrument all over their body. In the best case it would be very uncomfortable. And can we really trust all humans to always do it in the most gentle and sensitive way?

They suggest that the use of wool wouldn’t be for commercial incentive but for the common good but what if the common people change their minds? What would happen in the first economic crisis? What would happen if humans in cold areas would want wool but couldn’t live with sheeps? Would they barter it? Would the barter be soon replaced with commerce? And isn’t that gradually coming back to commercial exploitation of sheeps?

In every given moment, with every economic crisis, any climatic crisis, or even local and temporarily extremely bad weather events such as a hurricane or draught, or a natural disaster, the first to be hurt are the weakest ones in every society. So why preserve the weakest social class ever in history, which is not only at rock bottom but is far from any other social class, including human salves, which many activists wrongly compare their horror with animals’ horror.

Donaldson and Kymlicka also have no problem with consuming eggs:
“Humans could have chicken companions on the farm or in large backyards-chickens with flourishing lives, allowed plenty of scope to do what chickens like to do, chickens who explore and play and form social bonds and raise young under the watchful eyes of humans who protect them, shelter them, and care for their food and medical needs. And meanwhile, humans could consume some of the chickens’ eggs. It’s true that this relationship would in part be based on use-that is, many humans who would choose to have chicken companions would do so at least in part because they want some eggs. But this fact of use need not compromise the full protection of chickens’ rights and community membership. As in the sheep case, the primary concerns would be to ensure that mechanisms are in place to fully monitor and enforce these rights, and to regulate commercial pressures that might erode these rights.”

Such a suggestion perpetuates the concept of some animals functioning as food sources, which is very wrong conceptually and practically. Seriously arguing that this model could always be maintained or that every human would respect chickens’ rights is beyond naivety.
This whole theory of citizenship is of humans still running the world only in a much more considerate, fair and kind way, but of course even that is according to their measures.
If there is something dangerous about this theory it is not that it would turn humans away from much less demanding ideas such as veganism (a claim which is addressed in the first part), it is that it is a foot in the door for other ideas much less demanding and egalitarian such as ‘humanity really went too far with factory farming which is the real problem with consuming animals, the solution is small local family farms in which animals wonder around giving milk and eggs in exchange for food and protection’. Others would argue that since animals eat each other it is ok for humans to do so as well and offer “humane killing” and “happy meat”. In the best case, this realistic course of events will “only” end with traditional farms and not factory farms all over again.

When it comes to milk they have some reservations:
“Using milk from cows is more problematic. Dairy cows have been bred to produce abundant milk, and this breeding has undermined their health and longevity. (For example, excess milk production reduces calcium stores, leading to weaker bones.) In addition, to make dairy production a commercially viable process, male calves are killed to produce veal, cows are continuously impregnated to keep them producing milk (which wears them out, and  contributes to many diseases), and calves are separated from cows in order to maximize the percentage of milk that goes to humans.”
“This does not mean that there will be no cows, just not very many. There will always be people who want to have cow companions (or pig companions), but the reality is that since these animals are less ‘useful’ (under non-exploitative conditions), fewer of them would be brought into the human-animal community. On the other hand, cautious commercialization of the use of cow’s milk could lead to it becoming a luxury good, resulting in a limited but stable cow community.”

Their focus on humans’ self-interest motives goes to show the main focus of the book which is the humane perspective. As we wrote in the former part of this series, we think that these animals mustn’t exist, but they beg to differ and are even highly critical of the abolition/extinction position. However, it seems that according to them populations of domesticated animals should be determined by the usefulness of these animals to humans. The number of cows in the world is in accordance with the number of humans who would find them useful enough to rear them. And that is obviously an extremely speciesist and exploitative position.
The factor of usefulness is the last that should play any role in the decision regarding the existence of cows. The fact that “cows have been bred to produce abundant milk, and this breeding has undermined their health and longevity” is more than sufficient. Regardless of any human consideration, since these cows are suffering by their very existence, they mustn’t exist. Even if humans could find a sustainable model for living with them, cows with innate severe deformities mustn’t exist.
And it is not just cows. Other domesticated animals were also bred to produce abundance: chickens from the egg industry were breed to produce abundant number of eggs which has undermined their health and longevity, chickens from the flesh industry were bred to produce abundant flesh which has undermined their health and longevity, and same goes for pigs, ducks, rabbits and turkeys. All of them are victims of the most tyrant species ever, and all of them must never exist because of their unavoidable impairments, and because of humans’ unavoidable urge to exploit.

Donaldson and Kymlicka are aware of the potential danger however formulate it in a very peculiar if not circular argument.
“Given that humans have a great stake in using animals, there is an omnipresent danger that they will adopt a self-serving picture of animals’ needs and preferences. This is why we have emphasized the need to recognize and enable animal agency. We have a responsibility to try to understand what animals are able to communicate to us about their needs and preferences, and to facilitate their realization of their own life projects.”
This argument is flawed because it is not that humans have a great stake in using animals but that they are using animals, and there is no omnipresent danger that they will adopt a self-serving picture of animals’ needs and preferences but that they have been doing it since the beginning of their history. The great danger Donaldson and Kymlicka are referring to is relevant only after humans have recognized and enabled animal agency, before that, it is not a case of potential danger but everyday reality. And given that this danger will always be relevant, even after humans have recognized and enabled animal agency, obviously there should be no use under any circumstances of animals ever again.

Even if the imaginary citizenship theory would someday be globally implemented, how can we ever be sure that all humans would respect that at all times? And why should we entrust animals’ fates in the unreliable hands of the ones who have been torturing them since forever?!

Ideas of using animals out of dignity and not out of greed are already very popular. Many humans who exploit animals in small farms are often making such claims. Of course it would be very wrong to compare these kind of people with Donaldson and Kymlicka who we are sure genuinely seek the best option for animals. However it is easy to see how easily humans would go from their version of using animals, to “happy meat”. It is not that we could never totally trust humans to always be aware of the line and never to cross it, it is that we can totally trust them to always cross the line.

5. Use of Animal Labor

“So far, we have focused on cases in which humans benefit from using animals engaged in doing what they do naturally-eating grass, growing wool, producing manure, eggs, and milk. A different form of use involves training animals to perform various kinds of work for humans, such as assistance and therapy training for dogs, or police training for horses. There are some jobs that dogs and other animals can perform without significant training. For example, if we return to Sheepville, we can imagine that the community also includes some dogs or donkeys who help to protect the sheep.”

No, sheeps don’t naturally produce excessive wool, chickens don’t produce so many eggs, and cows don’t produce excessive milk. Nothing about this behavior is natural. They are called domesticated animals for a reason. And there is nothing natural about dogs protecting sheeps, in fact it is extremely ironic since dogs have evolved from wolves, and wolves definitely don’t naturally protect sheeps, but more like sheeps need protection from wolves. And also, despite that their function would be to protect the sheeps, the dogs would be another source of stress for the sheeps who see them as potential predators.

And the example of horses used for policing missions, besides the obvious exploitation and speciesism, as the horses never perform tasks for their own good or for their own kind but always for humans, this use of them is utterly horrendous for them.
Even when these horses are not violently attacked by humans who punch them, throw things at them, scare them with flares, spray them with tear gas, as often happens during riots of all kinds, they are always ridden by a grown human and they are always stressed as they are naturally shy animals. Under natural conditions, horses have evolved to avoid conflicts as much as they can, their natural tendency is to flee under a threat, not to fight. And that is exactly the opposite of the missions forced on horses exploited for police work, therefore they are always stressed and nervous.

And as they do in all of the points, they write a disclaimer which is no more than a fig leaf:
“We emphasize, however, that the possibilities for exploitation are very high, and the use of animals for these purposes would need to be carefully regulated. For such use to be nonexploitative, the animal must be in a position to give a clear indication that they enjoy the activity, that they thrive on the stimulation and contact, and that the work is not a price they need to pay to receive the love, approval, treats, and care that are their due (and need). Work must be balanced with lots of down time in which dogs engage in other activities and socialize with their human and dog friends. In other words, dogs (and other working animals) should have the same opportunity human citizens have to control the conditions under which they contribute to society, and to follow their own inclinations in terms of how they live their lives, and with whom they spend time.”

Since they rely on the human rights theory, it is worth noting that in many cases worker exploitation and human slavery is not a result of lack of laws and regulations. Slavery is now illegal in every nation on earth, yet it can be found in every corner of the globe. Even on the narrowest definition of slavery it’s likely that there are far more slaves now than there were victims of the Atlantic slave trade.
There have been several attempts in the history of the modern world to abolish slavery. They have all failed. Slavery has always re-emerged in one form or another.

In a way the fact that slavery is not legal anywhere but happens everywhere makes it worse because it means that slavery exists not because of political disputes between groups or anything of this sort, it exists and is so prevalent because humans don’t care enough to stop it and are benefiting from it.

6) Medical Care

“Health care is a right of membership in contemporary societies, and domesticated animals have the right to be treated as members. This indeed explains why we have duties to provide health care to domestic dogs and cats, and not (or not always) to wolves or leopards in the wild (we discuss our obligations to animals in the wild in Chapter 6). These duties would likely be fulfilled through some scheme of animal health insurance.”

If the point regarding the use of animal products is considered the most controversial, this one is probably considered the most delusional.
In a world where each and every activity of each and every individual animal is directed towards the fastest and cheapest way to gain the maximum benefit for humans, including for example preventing food and water from animals before they are murdered since it no longer effects the weight of the flesh torn from their bodies (even in cases of very long-distance transport by road, railway or sea), it is absolutely delusional to suggest such a dramatic reversal of priorities as health care for every domesticated animal.

It is totally implausible to suggest turning from a situation where every animal exploiter makes tremendous efforts to save every penny at the expense of each exploited animal, to a situation where many pennies would be invested in the same animals’ wellbeing. In a world abounded with wars, diseases, hunger, and poverty among the human population, it is impossible to imagine humanity investing much of its budget in animals it now views as the phase between grass and meat.

Not that humans are by any means more important than nonhumans, but they are in the eyes of most humans and yet a universal medical care is not a right that even all humans are currently entitled to. So universal medical care for all chickens seems beyond utopian.

Donaldson and Kymlicka use dogs to make many if not most of their points along the book, including this one. So it is crucial to say a few things about humans’ relations with dogs.

The history of humans’ relation to dogs, their most beloved animal, is violent and oppressive. Thousands of dogs are experimented on every year. Who knows how many are tied to one place, which is also where they eat, shit and sleep, because humans force them to protect their property. Millions are still forced to serve humans in the military, the police, various rescue units, guiding for blind humans and so on. Thousands of dogs are forced to fight each other for humans’ entertainment and gambling, and tens of thousands per year are forced to race each other for humans’ entertainment and gambling. And of course, in south East Asia dogs are also eaten.

Dogs are also paying very high costs for living with humans even in cases when they are not being used to fill more explicit functions for humans but to keep them company and greet them when they come home. Hundreds of millions are left alone in humans’ houses for long hours which seem like an eternity for such social animals. This issue is very common and practically unavoidable. Other issues are even more inherent. Humans’ affection for the cute and infants like, has produced dog breeds in which full-grown dogs resemble perpetual puppies. On the psychological level, by breeding dogs for Neoteny (retention of juvenile features), humans have created emotionally immature dogs who are prone to neuroses. And on the physical level, the practice of selective breeding so dogs would come in all shapes, sizes, colors, and temperaments, has terrible consequences expressed in hereditary defects, deformities, and infirmities within any given breed. Here is a very partial list:
About 60% of Golden Retrievers will get cancer during their lifetime. Additionally, Golden Retrievers are prone to a variety of health problems such as canine hip dysplasia (CHD), seasonal allergies, and diseases of the skin.
Boxers also develop cancer pretty frequently. They’re particularly prone to lymphoma and mast cell tumors. They are also prone to heart-related and thyroid problems, as well as skin allergies.
German Shepherds are prone to hereditary hip dysplasia, a deformation of the hip socket that may lead to arthritis or lameness. Degenerative myelopathy is also a common condition among German Shepherds. This is an untreatable disease that results in progressive paralysis.
Due to their out of proportion bodies, Dachshunds are prone to getting back injuries that can lead to paralysis and in the worst cases, death.
Pugs’ flat snouts restrict airflow, making it hard for them to breathe. Their eyes can bulge painfully and they can easily contract infections.
Siberian Husky often falls victim to autoimmune diseases of the skin that cause sores, blisters, and itchiness that can be so bad that they chew their own skin. Their eminent blue eyes are prone to juvenile cataracts, corneal dystrophy, and progressive retinal atrophy.
Cocker Spaniels are prone to suffer from Syringomyelia, which essentially involves cavities forming in the spinal cord that become filled with fluid. It can occur in any type of animal but has become prevalent in this breed of dog due to the fact that they have been bred to have very small heads. This disparity in size between the brain and the skull puts the spinal cord under pressure and causes malformations. Syringomyelia can cause severe neck and head pain, putting the dog at risk of lifelong agony if not successfully treated.
Being very large dogs, Bernese Mountain Dogs are susceptible to both hip and elbow dysplasia, yet their greatest tragedy is an extremely high rate of Histiocytic Cancer that typically develop between 5 and 8 years old.
Weimaraners can be born with a rare condition called Von Willebrand Disease, which inhibits the blood’s ability to clot properly.
Poodles can develop gastric dilatation-volvulus, commonly known as bloat, which is frequently fatal without surgery. Poodles are also prone to epilepsy and a degenerative bone disease that could cause immobilization.
And finally (in this very partial list) bulldogs, the dogs who are considered the most extreme example of genetic manipulation in the dog-breeding world, struggle with the same flat-face issues as Pugs do. These dogs are also prone to weight gain, as well as allergies. Some kinds are also prone to skin infections due to their skin folds. The large size of a Bulldog’s head, which has been selectively bred for its pleasing appearance, has led to a problem that is unique to the breed. Mothers have tremendous difficulty giving birth, as the puppies are simply too large to pass through the birth canal. This means that a natural birth is often not possible with Bulldogs. Instead, vets have to perform cesarean sections in order to ensure the safety of both the puppies and the mother, otherwise both could be killed during birth.

Human began domesticating dogs about 20,000 to 40,000 years ago. The American kennel club registers 135 dog breeds, most of which suffer from at least one of more than 300 genetically transmitted abnormalities.

Dogs – Donaldson and Kymlicka’s fixed and repeated example – are animals who suffer from many emotional, mental and physical problems, and other animals are suffering from humans’ desire to live with dogs as most are not vegans. The share of dogs who are vegans, who don’t suffer from any physical condition due to selective breeding, and who live with humans who are with them most of the time and they get to play and walk as much as they wish, is probably less than one percent of all dogs.

7) Sex and Reproduction

Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that limiting animals’ reproduction is not speciesist since there are limitations on humans’ sexual and reproductive lives as well. Only that in the case of humans these limitations are mostly on their sexual lives, and mostly to prevent sexual exploitation and STD’s, and when it comes to reproduction, limitations are mostly in cases of birth defects, not because there are too many individuals to care for.

But they insist that limitations on human reproduction also involve population control:
“Societies engage in extensive use of incentives (and sometimes more coercive measures) to encourage or discourage people from reproducing. Our sex and reproductive lives are in fact highly regulated, although the form that this regulation takes is largely internalized self-regulation and response to social pressures and incentives.”
Only that except for China it is always incentives to reproduce, and only in cases of severe diseases not to reproduce. When did any state except for China (which gave up its one-child policy about 5 years ago), ever restricted human reproduction? On the other hand there are many states who encourage reproduction.
Obviously there is an extreme problem of sustainability, within states as well as globally, and it still hasn’t made humans discourage people from reproducing.
And speaking of human reproduction, as mentioned earlier, Zoopolis should have stated that it must be dramatically reduced in order to reduce humans’ ecological foot print and pressure on other animals who would be common citizens of their community. How is it fair that some citizens have a tremendous foot print yet they can reproduce as much as they want and others have miniature foot print compared to them yet their reproduction is limited?

“Where animals do not or cannot selfregulate their reproduction, the costs to others of having to care for and maintain their offspring could become prohibitive. In these circumstances, imposing some limits on their reproduction is, we believe, a reasonable element in a larger scheme of cooperation. As in the case of mobility restrictions, reproduction restrictions would need to be carefully justified, and involve the least restrictive available methods. This justification is importantly different from the abolitionist call for universal birth control/sterilization leading to extinction. Abolitionists would restrict the liberties of individual animals without reference to the interests of those animals. With the citizenship model, restrictions can only be justified by reference to the interests of the individual, while recognizing that these interests include being part of a cooperative social project which involves both rights and duties.”

In the best case this argument is embarrassing and in the worst case it is fascist. It is embarrassing since clearly they realize that it is impossible to avoid regulating animals’ reproduction since humanity would never accept granting them with full citizenship, all the more so when there are so many of them. So they suggest limiting animals’ reproduction but since they wish to distinguish themselves from the animal rights theory who suggests total control over domesticated animals’ reproduction (which is according to Donaldson and Kymlicka to restrict the liberties of individual animals without reference to the interests of those animals), under their citizenship model on the other hand, “restrictions can only be justified by reference to the interests of the individual, while recognizing that these interests include being part of a cooperative social project which involves both rights and duties“. Can you spot the differences? Neither can we. In both cases it is a restriction on the liberties of individual animals. There is no way around it. They are saying that they are justifying the restriction with reference to the interests of the individual but they are actually justifying it by placing the interest of the cooperative social project (as if it is even an ethical entity) before individuals. That is false and speciesist as clearly they don’t suggest that in the case of humans. The human race is the most unsustainable species ever. Why not restricting human reproduction for one person per couple in order to tackle environmental problems? Or to reduce harm to other animals? Clearly the more humans the more suffering animals, so why not restrict human reproduction in any case?
The road to Zoopolis must go through a dramatic reduction in human population and that obligates restricting human reproduction to at the most one child policy if not halting reproduction entirely for at least one generation. That could be a significant step towards Zoopolis, especially for sovereignty for “wild” animals, the topic of the next part. But that is not on the table. Instead they are making a very flawed argument. While they are not ready to state that humans must drastically restrict their population size despite how self-evident this is, they are ready to intervene in animals’ reproduction. And while they are criticizing the animal rights theory for restricting the liberties of individual animals despite that the aim is obviously to prevent further and future restrictions of liberties of individual animals, they justify their own suggestion of restrictions of liberties of individual animals by appealing to non-entity notions such as cooperative social project. And that part of their argument is fascist, since it gives the moral high ground to the system which obviously is not a morally relevant entity, at the expense of its members which are the only morally relevant entities.
Animal rights activists suggest restricting or preventing domesticated animals’ reproduction in order to prevent harms to domesticated animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka know that but they are making all the wrong moves to avoid the inevitable conclusion which is domesticated animals’ extinction.

8) Predation/Diet

“Dog and cat companions have been long removed from a wild context in which they could adequately feed themselves through hunting and scavenging. Feral dogs and cats can often survive on their own, but they rarely thrive unless their diets are supplemented by humans. Indeed, dogs and cats are long adapted to living with human families, and sharing their food. In recent decades we have gotten used to the idea of specially prepared cat and dog foods. (In part this reflects growing understanding that dogs and cats have different nutritional needs from humans. In part it reflects a desire to find markets for the by-products of an industrialized meat system.) But for most of human-pet history, dogs and cats have just eaten family leftovers and their own scroungings. Dogs especially have evolved to be highly flexible omnivores. There is ample evidence that dogs can thrive on a (suitably planned) vegan diet.”

Even if all the dogs that live with humans would become totally vegan, the estimations are that out of the 900 million dogs in the world, more than 80% don’t live in humans’ houses but on the streets. About 200 million are stray dogs meaning dogs that used to live with humans but were abandoned by them and found themselves straying in the streets, and most of the rest are feral dogs. So it would be very hard if not impossible to regulate the diet of most dogs, which would most probably eat other animals. And currently, even most of the dogs who live with vegan humans, are not vegans.

Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that it is wrong to let cats hunt other animals. However, since they are the only truly carnivores among domesticated animals, they might not make do with a vegan diet supplemented with taurine. Since as mentioned earlier they are permitting using animal products, as far as they go cats can be fed with chickens’ eggs.
“a commercial industry in egg (or milk) products is probably not viable (and would invite abuse), and so there can be no mass production to solve the problem of animal protein for cats. However, it could be that for people who want to live with cat companions, part of the deal, as it were, is that they might need to find an ethical source of eggs, perhaps by keeping their own chicken companions as well.”

Humanity had brought the situation that there are so many carnivores as cats and fed them with other animals’ flesh for decades, and now instead of solving that problem from the root, they suggest that if humans want to live with a domesticated animal, that they have created, they must keep another domesticated animal that they have created. A chicken selectively bred to produce as many eggs as possible at the expense of crucial body functions would be forced to live so humans can fulfil their desire to live with another domesticated animal, with a limited freedom and human regulated life so that they won’t go out and hunt. That is to add insult to injury.

“Cats are the only true carnivores amongst domesticated animals, and thus pose a unique challenge in human-animal society. There may be no way for humans to have cat companions without dealing with a certain level of moral complexity regarding their diet and other restrictions necessary for them to be part of human-animal society. (Such restrictions are not just diet-related, but involve careful monitoring of cats outdoors to protect other animals from their predatory activities.) Does this level of restriction undermine the possibility of cats being flourishing members of mixed society? Does it mean that we would be justified in bringing about their extinction? At the very least, it means that any individual human contemplating having a companion cat is signing on for a great deal of responsibility in terms of doing the work to ensure their cat flourishes under the necessary restrictions.”

Even if all cats would be supplied with a protein rich vegan diet supplemented with taurine, some of them would try to hunt. Humans can restrict them from getting out of the house but that would be a restriction of their rights. Of course the question is what is the difference between a cat hunting another animal or a “wild” animal hunting another animal, we’ll broadly deal with the issue of “wild” animals in the next part, so we’ll shortly argue that indeed for the victim the identity of the victimizer is meaningless. But it does matter in the case of predators that humans have created and can control. Street cats not only can harm other animals but be severely hurt themselves by cars, heat, cold, disease, other animals, hunger or dehydration. So cats must be neutered for their own and for others’ sake, and so if a spay and neuter project is successfully conduced there would be no domesticated cats anymore. Humans can easily prevent the existence of at least one predator, all the more so one which, according to a research conducted a few years ago by the Smithsonian Conservation Biology institute and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services, is estimated to be responsible for the killing of between 1.4 to 3.7 billion birds and between 6.9 to 20.7 billion mammals per year, and which is also very vulnerable by itself, but they are not even doing that.

9) Political Representation

“We have also emphasized that domesticated animals have the capacity to participate in this process, if assisted by those ‘collaborators’ who have learned how to interpret their expressions of preferences. But this sort of dependent agency is only going to be effective, politically, if there are institutional mechanisms that link domesticated animals and their collaborators to political decision-makers. We need, in short, some way to ensure the effective political representation of domesticated animals.”
“…Effective representation within this scheme will require institutional reforms at any number of levels. It will involve representation in the legislative process, but it will also require representing animals in, for example, municipal land planning decisions, or on the governance boards of various professions and public services (police, emergency services, medicine, law, urban planning, social services, etc.). In all of these institutions, domesticated animals have been rendered invisible, and their interests ignored.”

Donaldson and Kymlicka aspiration for making animals active in the political sphere is truly admirable. However the citizenship model doesn’t really turn animals from passive to active because it is still humans who will make all the calls. It is unavoidable. At any given moment it would be humans who would make the decision whether to make a decision based on animals’ interests or to distort if not ignore their interests, and it will always be according to human interoperation of other animals’ needs and desires.
Even if it was possible for humans to read nonhumans very well, eventually everything is depended on humans’ willingness to implement their interpretations of animals’ needs and desires. It is always humans’ decision. They can choose to respect animals’ needs and desires or not. Humans can choose to force their own interests on others or to try and be considerate of others’ interests as well, and even then it will always be based on their subjective interpretation of what others prefer.

Given that that conflict of interests will always exist, humans’ interpretation will always be biased.
If we’ll take for example humans most favorite animal – dogs, they prefer never to be alone, walk and play as much as possible, and get their most favorite food all the time. No dog lives like that. And many live horrible lives. And if it doesn’t happen with humans’ most favorite animal why would it ever happen with fishes and chickens?

Even if humans weren’t so biased when it comes to others’ needs, let alone when these needs must be fulfilled by humans themselves, their ability to interpret animals’ needs is anyway highly questionable. Donaldson and Kymlicka are giving examples of humans’ ability to interpret dogs (as usual) which are probably the animals that humans can best understand, but when it comes to other animals it is highly unlikely that humans would be able to really understand them and act accordingly even if they really wanted to.

How is it possible to ensure that animals’ trustees would always act according to animals’ best interests and not according to humans’ self-interest, which among it is the desire to preserve animals’ exploitation?

Even if humans had truly acted in good faith, it is wrong to entrust animals’ fates in humans’ hands, and it is wrong to experiment with interpretations of their needs at their expense.
But way before that, at no moment in history had humans proven that they had good faith, so far, at every moment in history they have proven to have an extremely bad one. Therefore, what we must do is make humanity history.

The following post is the second part in a series of posts dedicated to Zoopolis. If you haven’t read the first part yet it is recommended that you do so before reading the following text, especially if you haven’t read the book Zoopolis itself.
In this part we’ll focus on the first Zoopolis’ citizenship category ­– full citizenship for domesticated animals.

As argued in the former post Donaldson and Kymlicka think that the reason animals haven’t gained rights yet is because of the animal rights theory which they find unattainable and unjust. One of the injustices they point at is the abolitionist/extinctionist position which is a common resolution among activists regarding “farm animals”. In this text we’ll present and object to their arguments against the abolitionist/extinctionist position. In the next post we’ll present and object to their alternative model for domesticated animals. Continue reading →

It’s not new that the animal rights movement mostly focuses on what humans mustn’t do to animals but doesn’t really offer serious suggestions regarding what humans should do with animals, and that it basically ignores entire issues regarding animals. In recent years some political philosophers are trying to fill this vacuum. Traditionally, animals were totally disregarded in political philosophy but it is starting to change, especially in the last 15 years. Probably the most famous political thesis is the one presented in the book Zoopolis, which was published exactly a decade ago. Therefore Zoopolis will be in the center of the following discussion regarding political thesis about humans relations with animals.

Zoopolis offers a new model for human-animal relations, one which is based on a political theory rather than on an ethical one. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, the book’s authors, argue that humans have different obligations to different animals according to the relations they have with them. Based on that premise they suggest employing concepts from the Citizenship Theory. Therefore, the framework is that domesticated animals should be recognized as full citizens of humans’ communities, wild animals who live outside of humans’ communities should be recognized as members of their own sovereign communities, and non-domesticated animals who live within humans’ communities (whom they call “liminal” animals) as denizens which means they are recognized as residents of humans’ communities, but not as full citizens.

Before elaborating on the theory and on each category, it is important to address the origin and motive behind it. Intuitively it may seem as if it is aimed for a post-institutionalized exploitation world, and/or is a result of frustration that so far political philosophy had contributed very little to the status of nonhuman animals. Although both things are true in the sense that the authors are coming from the realm of political philosophy, and that they are also motivated by the need for a sustainable and just model for human-animal relations the day after factory farms are gone, these are not the main motives. The central claim of the book is that the animal rights movement is failing, and that it fails because the animal rights theory is lacking and has some structural problems:
“The animal advocacy movement is at an impasse. The familiar strategies and arguments for articulating issues and mobilizing public opinion around animal welfare, developed over the past 180 years, have had some success, on some issues. But the built-in limits of these strategies have increasingly become clear, leaving us unable to address, or even to identify, some of the most serious ethical challenges in our relations with animals. Our aim in this book is to offer a new framework, one that takes ‘the animal question’ as a central issue for how we theorize the nature of our political community, and its ideas of citizenship, justice, and human rights. This new framework, we believe, opens up new possibilities, conceptually and politically, for overcoming current roadblocks to progressive change.”

The following post, which is the first in a series of posts dedicated to a critical review of Zoopolis, would focus on the claim that the animal rights movement’s problem is the animal rights theory, as well as the general idea of humans’ different obligations to different animals according to the relations humans have with them. The next four parts would focus on each citizenship category according to the books’ order, so the next part, as well as the one following it would be dedicated to domesticated animals, the fourth part to wild animals, and the fifth and last part to “liminal” animals. Continue reading →

The final part of this series of posts regarding Why We Love Dogs Eat Pigs and Wear Cows An Introduction to Carnism is respectively about Joy’s final chapter of the book.

In it, Joy suggests to fight Carnism by bearing witness.
All along the book her focus is prominently on humans. On humans being deceived to act against their true nature, being deceived to consume unhealthy products, being victims of environmental pollution, and of course risking themselves in the dangerous job of murdering and tearing apart other animals. In the last chapter, again she asks humans to focus on themselves.
“when we witness, we validate, or make real, the suffering the system works so hard to hide, and we also validate our authentic reaction to it. Witnessing connects us with the truth of Carnistic practices, as well as with our inner truth, our empathy. We bear witness to others, and to ourselves”.
But ethics mustn’t be about connecting to ourselves, but about how others are being treated. It is not about us, it is about them. Morality shouldn’t be about witnessing the atrocities, but first and foremost about doing something to stop them. And in the case of the systematic exploitation of animals, suggesting bearing witness is also extremely anthropocentric since it shouldn’t be about us humans witnessing other animals. It is not about how humans feel about what nonhumans go through, but about what nonhumans go through. Morality should be about the victims. In a victim oriented ethics, the focus is not on what the activists think the victimizers’ interests are or what they are willing or unwilling to do about the cruelty they are involved in. It is about the victims and what they need to be done for them, regardless of what the victimizers’ interests, views and desires are.
Activists shouldn’t bear witness, they should bear solutions so the suffering will end. And it is not going to happen as long as activists keep believing that humans are naturally good but are deceived by a bad system that makes them do bad things and all that activists have to do is to expose the truth to them.

Continue reading →

While activists should see all the harms as direct ones, as humans know they happen, including harms that are a result of habitat destruction, deforestation, chemical pollution, electricity manufacture, and etc., Joy tries to convince activists that all the harms are indirect, including the ones of factory farms. She is doing that by inventing a cognitive state which is ‘knowing but not knowing’.

There is no mental state such as knowing without knowing. Of course many humans know little about what meat production really involves, so there is knowing little. There is knowing but not thinking about it. There is knowing and not wanting to stop. But there is no knowing without knowing.
People know, they don’t want to know more or know but don’t want to think about it, but they don’t “know but don’t know”. And when you know but don’t want to know more or don’t want to think about it, you don’t care. Continue reading →

In the previous post regarding Melanie Joy’s Why We Love Dogs Eat Pigs and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism, we have focused on humans’ relations with dogs, being a keystone in her thesis. We argued that it is true that some humans love dogs, but not all of them, not in any case, and not in every point in history. Humans’ love of dogs is not a natural constant truth, but a relationship with a history and conditions.
Like in the case of dogs, it is true that some humans care about animals, but not all of them, definitely not in any case, and most certainly not in every point in history. Humans care for animals other than dogs is also not a natural truth, but a relationship with a history and conditions.

About Caring

If her thesis was right, meaning that humans basically and naturally care about animals, and the only reason they don’t care about specific kinds of animals, is because they were taught by society that these animals are meant to be used by humanity, than humans would have cared about all the rest of the species. Following Carnism’s logic, humans were supposed to care about all the animals who don’t belong to the species which they were allegedly conditioned not to care about. But that is of course not the case, not today, and not ever in history. Continue reading →

In the following several posts, we’ll focus on Melanie Joy’s theory. That is after we discussed Norbert Elias who argues that humans relation to meat changed because they started to feel repugnant by their own animality and so gradually felt repugnance for meat, and after we discussed Nick Fiddes who argues that humans don’t eat meat despite that it is made out of animals but because it is made out of animals, and then Keith Tester who argues that humans who choose not to eat meat are actually doing so to define their own humanity. Melanie Joy however, argues that humans eat meat not because it is made of animals but despite that it is made of animals, and only because of a highly structured belief system that conditions them to see some animals as food and others as not.
According to Joy, humans are naturally empathic and caring towards animals, and only because of this highly structured belief system, which she calls the Carnism ideology, are they able to subdue their natural inclination and hurt the ones they actually care about.

We disagree with her Carnism theory, mainly with the power and influence she ascribes to it, and more importantly we disagree with the theory’s foundational assumption – that humans are naturally good and caring. Such claims are very appealing to flesh eaters and thus are tactically tempting for some activists. The biggest problem with adopting these false views is that it can convince activists to act against animals’ interests. Some might actually genuinely believe that humans are actually naturally good and caring, and that is a dangerous idea for animals. In the following series of posts we explain why.

We start with humans’ relations with dogs, obviously not because we think it is the most important aspect, but because its Joy’s starting point as well as a key element in her whole theory. Continue reading →

In the last post we shortly discussed a new research regarding the sixth extinction episode . In this one we shortly discuss a newly published book by Peter Brannen about the 5 previous mass extinction episodes called “The Ends of the World”.

The book tells the story of the five biggest mass extinctions, and what can be learned from them about the current one. Obviously the target audience is not activists and supporters of the E.A.S movement , but it is very relevant for us. Continue reading →

In the last post we have mentioned Joan Dunayer’s definition of speciesism and it seems that the spirit of some of the ideas she argued in her book Speciesism from a decade ago are expressed in the World Day for the End of Speciesism, so we thought that for a completer view, a critical review of the book is necessary. Continue reading →

Effective Banality

In the last couple of years Peter Singer has set himself as spokesperson of a new movement called Effective Altruism.
His latest book, which to its last chapter we addressed in a post called “From Groundbreaking Animal Liberation to Neverending Animal Exploitation”, is called The Most Good You Can Do. It presents the movement’s basic idea,as he simply says in its preface -we should do the most good we can.

Unfortunately and disappointingly, by “we”Singer is referring to the already allegedly do gooders of the world. The book and movement, clearly aim at a small section of the population. He basically offers a practical instruction guide for donors and potential donors, calling them to think before they donate because there are tremendous differences in the effectiveness potential of different charities.

Singer points out that in the United States alone there are almost one million charities, receiving a total of approximately $200 billion a year with an additional $100 billion donated to religious congregations and all this money could be distributed much more effectively.
He is obviously right, but we certainly don’t want to hear it from him. It is very depressing that human society needs a bold thinker like Peter Singer for such embarrassingly elementary inferences.
Continue reading →

A call to save human tyranny from possible extinction in 2015

A call to liberate animals from human tyranny in 1975

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It so happens that our third post is also the third post about the possibility of an asteroid collision, but not since the first international asteroid day was held yesterday, but since 2 months ago Peter Singer published a new book in which he also addresses the annihilation possibility, and speaks out about actively mobilizing caring people to regard this issue. Only that he calls for the exact opposite.

Undoubtedly, his status is in drastic decline within the movement (which is literally named after his own pioneering historic book) due to some very miserable statements he made over the years. However it was still surprising and disappointing that in his last book he not only made another significant step of disconnection, at least from the more radical activists, it seems that he lost contact with his own perceptions and with reality.

The book is kind of a manifest of the ideological movement he is part of in recent years called effective altruism, which basically asks people who wish to donate time or money to charities, to stop and think where their limited resources would do the most good possible, and accordingly it is titled The Most Good You Can Do.
In the following post we’ll refer to the rest of the book but currently we want to relate to its last extremely depressing part.

The chapter name is Preventing Human Extinction, and in it Singer lists some of what he refers to as extinction threats. He focuses on the option of an asteroid collision, mainly since as opposed to the rest of the risks he specified, humans can roughly estimate this risk possibility and can potentially prevent it. These two are crucial elements in effective altruism calculations, as the basic idea is how to reasonably choose the purpose which would produce the most good.
All along the chapter he deals with the question: Should we also be putting resources into developing the ability to deflect any objects that appear to be heading for us?
Continue reading →